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I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright law operates primarily as a strict liability, regime
whenever infringing behavior constitutes a direct infringement2 of
copyright. When behavior qualifies as an indirect infringement, gaps
in copyright protection are filled by principles of contributory and
vicarious liability.3  Although the application of these liability
constructs has never been a simple matter,4 recent growth in the on-
line industry5 has resulted in a dramatic confusion and divergence of
1. Strict liability refers to the fact that neither knowledge nor intent on the part of the
defendant is required to support a finding of copyright infringement. See Buck v. Jewell-
LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) ("Intention to infringe is not essential under the
Act"); De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1944) (stating that the ignorance of the
copyright infringer is immaterial); Ralph S. Brown and Robert C. Denicola, Cases on Copyright,
Unfair Competition, and Other Topics Bearing on the Protection of Literary, Musical, and
Artistic Works 474 (Foundation, 6th ed. 1995) (stating that "'innocence' does not excuse the
infringement). See also D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 35-36 (2d. Cir. 1990)
(noting that innocence or willfulness may nonetheless be relevant to an award of statutory
damages under § 504(c) of the Copyright Act).
2. Direct infringement occurs when liability is premised upon the defendant's own
behavior; indirect infringement, on the other hand, occurs when the defendant's liability is
premised upon infringing acts committed by another.
3. The Copyright Act does not explicitly recognize infringement based upon the actions of
third parties. However, language in the Act and its legislative history illustrate that Congress
intended to recognize common law principles of vicarious and contributory liability. See
Copyrights Act, H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976) ("House Report"). See also
Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.04[A] at 12-70 (Matthew
Bender, 1995) (noting that the House Report "establishes the liability, whether vicarious or as a
contributory infringer, of one who does no more than cause or permit another to engage in an
infringing act"). In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that copyright liability can be
imposed for acts of infringement committed by others. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) ("The absence of such express language in the copyright statute
does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who
have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity').
The standards for imposition of vicarious or contributory liability in cases of indirect
infringement are higher than the imposition of strict liability in cases of direct infringement.
Vicarious liability may only be imposed "[wlhen the right and ability to supervise coalesce with
an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-even in the
absence of actual knowledge." Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d
Cir. 1963). Contributory liability applies when "one who, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another."
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
4. Shapiro, Bernstein, which provides explication of the application of vicarious liability
to copyright law, contains an irresistible passage that has perhaps unparalleled applicability to
the issues addressed in this Note: "This action for copyright infringement presents us with a
picture all too familiar in copyright litigation: a legal problem vexing in its difficulty, a dearth
of squarely applicable precedents, a business setting so common that the dearth of precedents
seems inexplicable, and an almost complete absence of guidance from the terms of the Copyright
Act." 316 F.2d at 305.
5. I use the term "on-line industry" loosely to describe the vast and ever-increasing array
of interactive information network services currently existing. These services include computer
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views. In particular, the law is currently unclear in two important
respects. First, opinions differ greatly as to whether computer
bulletin board operators ("sysops"6) should incur liability for the
infringing misdeeds of individual subscribers. 7 Second, the law is
unclear regarding whether an individual subscriber can be held liable
merely for browsing8 a copyrighted work that resides on a computer
bulletin board system ('BBS") without the copyright owner's
permissionY
bulletin boards ("BBSs"), the Internet and its related entities, and so-called "on-line service
providers" such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and America On-Line.
6. The sysop is the person who sets up, owns, and operates the BBS (in many cases for a
profit). This person establishes and is responsible for the procedures by which users interact
with the BBS. See generally Eric Schlacter, Cyberspace, The Free Market and the Free
Marketplace of Ideas: Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, 16
Hastings Comm/Ent L. J. 87, 101-07 (1993) (discussing the roles and responsibilities of the
sysop).
For purposes of general discussion, I use the terms BBS and sysop (an abbreviation of
systems operator) to include actual BBSs and BBS operators as well as similarly situated
parties. For a similar approach, see id. at 90 n.6. Such parties include on-line service providers
such as CompuServe, creators of Web pages on the World Wide Web, and other commercial or
non-commercial information service providers. It is conceded that these parties and systems are
often technically and technologically distinct, and that the capacity for control over the
information in these systems varies with the system. However, each of these systems acts in
some capacity as a repository of information; a place (for lack of a better word) where data and
files are stored for the benefit of the system's remote users. Consequently, each sysop takes
responsibility to some extent for the material residing in his or her system. The repository may
be as small as a home computer with a couple of dedicated telephone lines or as large as
CompuServe's vast computer banks. Nonetheless, these parties are similarly situated in that
they all face the potential specter of copyright liability for infringing material within their
systems. As will be discussed below, sysops of information repositories incur liablity when,
through the operation of their systems, infringing copyrighted material is made available to the
public. See Part III.C.
7. In the copyright context, the term "infringing misdeeds" refers primarily to the
uploading and downloading of infringing copyrighted material by individual subscribers without
the help or knowledge of the BBS operator or sysop. See, for example, the analysis provided in
Edward A. Cavazos and G. Chin Chao, System Operator Liability for a User's Copyright
Infringement, 4 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. J. 13, 15 (1995).
8. Digital browsing refers to the mere "experiencing" of a copyrighted work through
interaction with the BBS. When browsing, the user does not download, screen capture, or print
a permanent copy of the work. Browsing refers merely to viewing images and text, listening to
music, watching or playing an audiovisual work such as a film or video game, and so forth. In
all cases, the browsing user does not create a permanent reproduction of the work for use after
she disengages contact with the BBS.
As will be discussed at length below, it is the position of this Note that browsing in the
digital domain constitutes a fundamental right of the public to use copyrighted works without
incurring copyright liability. See Part III.
9. Either of these two legal uncertainties could alone encompass an entire Note. As a
practical matter, however, the issue of sysop liability is of far greater importance at this time to
courts, commentators, litigants, and this Note. Nonetheless, this Note treats the issues of sysop
and browser liability together due to their conceptual inseparability in the existing structure of
the Copyright Act.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
This Note analyzes these issues by reference to the factual
scenario in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,10 which reflects the fact
pattern underlying virtually all of the relevant cases. First,
subscriber A uploads unauthorized copyrighted material to a BBS.
Second, subscriber B browses the copyrighted material without
downloading it. Third, subscriber C downloads the copyrighted
material. At all times during the fact pattern, the sysop has no actual
knowledge of the presence of the unauthorized copyrighted material
on the BBS.
A determination of the proper liability regime for the sysop in
this fact pattern requires the resolution of three issues. First, one
must determine which of the copyright owner's rights have been in-
fringed by the activities listed in the fact pattern." Second, one must
identify the specific party or parties who violated these rights. Third,
one must determine the role played by each infringing party during
the infringement: was the party a direct infringer of the implicated
rights, or merely a contributor to the direct infringements committed
by another party? This Note will attempt to answer these questions
by reference to the 1976 Copyright Act,12 the Act's legislative history'
3
(the "House Report"), and relevant case law.
Commentators and courts seeking to resolve these issues have
generally fallen into one of two basic groups. One group favors what
this Note refers to as an under-protectionist interpretation of
copyright doctrine. Basically, the under-protectionist approach
asserts that a sysop is not responsible for unlawful acts perpetrated
by individual subscribers. Instead, the sysop should incur liability
only for copyright infringements of which she has knowledge. 14 This
10. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Playboy itself will be examined more closely in
Part II of this Note.
11. Copyright owners are granted five exclusive rights under the Copyright Act: repro-
duction, adaptation, distribution, public performance, and public display. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994
ed.). For the full text of § 106, see note 55.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994 ed.).
13. For full citation, see note 3.
14. Some commentators have proposed approaches that are far more under-protectionist
than the approach addressed here. See, for example, John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas:
A Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age (Everything You Know
About Intellectual Property Is Wrong), Wired 84, 85 (March 1994) (arguing that traditional
copyright law "cannot be patched, retrofitted, or expanded to contain digitized expression," and,
consequently, that "[wie will need to develop an entirely new set of methods as befits this
entirely new set of circumstances"); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on
the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board
Operators, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 345, 407-10 (1995) (concluding ultimately that sysops
should not face liability even when they have actual knowledge of infringing activity). In the
context of this Note, I would characterize such approaches as proposals for a radical departure
from existing law as they provide no real protection for copyrighted works in a digital medium.
442 [Vol. 49:439
19961 COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 443
group consists primarily of the sysops themselves, 15 scholarly
commentators, 16 interested Internet and BBS users, 7 and at least one
court.18 Essentially, this camp views contributory liability as the
proper legal framework under which to analyze sysop liability.
The second basic group, consisting mainly of copyright own-
ers 19 and the governmental authors of the White Paper,20 has adopted
Although such proposals may increase in importance in decades to come, they are not addressed
here. This Note simply seeks to make sense out of the technical aspects and policy objectives of
existing law as it applies to electronic environments.
15. After publication of the Green Paper, see note 20, a number of sysops and related
parties submitted a lengthy response document calling for an "actual knowledge" standard of
liability. See Comments of Online Service Providers on a Preliminary Draft of the Report of the
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights from Jeffrey P. Cunard of Debevoise &
Plimpton, Washington, D.C., to the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (Sept. 7, 1994)
(on file with the Commissioner). The Comments were prepared by Jeffrey P. Cunard (who, as it
happens, represented CompuServe in Frank Music, see note 228), and was submitted on behalf
of CompuServe, America On-line, Delphi Internet Services, GE Information Services, Lexis
Counsel Connect, Prodigy Services, Lance Rose & Associates (representing numerous
independent BBSs), and Ziff Communications.
16. See, for example, M. David Dobbins, Note, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability
for Users' Infringing Acts, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 217, 219 (1995); Cavazos and Chao, 4 Tex. Intell.
Prop. L. J. at 15-17 (cited in note 7).
17. See, for example, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure,
Public Hearings on the Preliminary Draft of The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
Property of the Information Infrastructure Task Force (Sept. 22, 1994) (testimony of Brian
Kahin, Interactive Multimedia Association). The transcripts to all four public hearings are on
file with the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and are currently available on-line at
gopher server iitf.doc.gov under "Speeches, Testimony and Documents." See also Comments on
the Green Paper from Professor Mitchell Golden of Harvard University to the Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks (on file with the Commissioner); Comments on the Green Paper from
Professors Neil Netanel and Mark Lemley of the University of Texas School of Law to the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (Sept. 2, 1994) (on file with the Commissioner).
18. The Netcom court, whose opinion will be addressed at length below, determined that
sysops could not be held strictly liable under the Copyright Act. Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-73 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
For discussion of the opinion, see Part IV.A.
19. Numerous copyright owners, including authors, songwriters, software developers and
publishers, and their representatives, have noted the increasing difficulty of maintaining
adequate copyright protection in the flourishing on-line environment. See, for example, Public
Hearings (Sept. 16, 1994) at 16 (cited in note 17) (testimony of Jeff Barry, songwriter); id. at 35
(testimony of James Newton Howard, composer); id. at 30 (testimony of William Barlow and
Robert Steinberg, Times-Mirror Company); id. at 50 (testimony of Thomas White, artist rights
enforcement consultant); id. at 55 (testimony of Steven Ames Brown, recording artist and small
production company representative); id. at 83 (testimony of Milton Olin, A & M Records); id. at
79 (testimony of Mike Malone, Alliance to Promote Software Innovation). The transcripts to all
four public hearings are on file with the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and are
currently available on-line at gopher server iitf.doc.gov under "Speeches, Testimony and
Documents."
20. The "White Paper" is formally known as Intellectual Property and the National
Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights
(Sept. 1995). This report is a 238-page document that examines in great detail the intellectual
property issues involved in information network communication systems such as computer
bulletin boards and the Internet. The Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, which is
a subcommittee of President Clinton's Information Infrastructure Task Force, issued the White
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what appears to be an over-protectionist approach to the relevant
copyright issues. As is evidenced by the White Paper and the draft
Green Paper, this group seeks to enhance the strong monopoly of
copyright owners.21 Its approach goes beyond imposing strict liability
upon sysops, and expands the definition of what constitutes infringing
activity to include a subscriber who merely browses a work without
downloading it.22
In contrast to the two positions outlined above, this Note ad-
vances a balanced approach. This approach rests on three underlying
premises. First, existing law contains implicit answers to the complex
issues at hand. 23 Second, the rapidly evolving nature of technology
makes it unwise to create new laws or to make exceptions to current
laws at this early stage. Third, market forces can and should de-
termine the future development of the on-line industry.
24
Paper as a final, follow-up document to the Draft Report it submitted in July 1994 (commonly
referred to as the "Green Paper"). The White Paper uses the term "National Information
Infrastructure," or "NII," to refer to its vision of the future aggregation of on-line services, BBSs,
and the Internet. Copies of each of these documents are on file with the Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks and are currently available on-line at gopher server iitf.doc.gov under
"Speeches, Testimony and Documents."
At least one scholarly commentator has also espoused views similar to those advocated by
copyright owners and the White Paper. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information
Superhighway" Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1466,
1479-81 (1995).
21. The Green Paper was criticized as an "advocacy document" which "at times misrepre-
sents the state of current law." Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L. J. 29, 32 (1994). This view has been echoed in the works of a number of commentators.
See, for example, Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NI Intellectual Property Report,
37 Comm. of the ACM 21, 22 (Dec. 1994) (stating that "not since the King of England in the 16th
century gave a group of printers exclusive rights to print books in exchange for the printers'
agreement not to print heretical or seditious material has a government copyright policy been so
skewed in favor of publisher interests and so detrimental to the public interest").
22. See White Paper at 64-66 (cited in note 20). For discussion, see Part III.B.
23. The balanced approach adopts the position announced in Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1984). In Redd Home, the court
stated that "[a] defendant.., is not immune from liability for copyright infringement simply be-
cause the technologies are of recent origin or are being applied to innovative uses. Although
this case involves a novel application of relatively recent technological developments, it can
nonetheless be readily analyzed and resolved within the existing statutory framework." Id. at
157-58.
24. The varying size and nature of BBS and on-line systems available, along with the
relative newness of the industry, suggest that rules governing behavior should be bargained for
and negotiated by the individual parties to any given situation, as opposed to being dictated by
legislative or judicial mandate. Use of a market-oriented "contracts" paradigm for the govern-
ance of sysops, subscribers, and copyright owners has been proposed or considered by a number
of commentators. See, for example, Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace,"
55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 993, 1043-46 (1994); David R. Johnson and Kevin A. Marks, Mapping
Electronic Data Communications Onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our
Conscience (And Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 487, 489 (1993); Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators for Infringement by Subscribers, 1
B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 6, *11-14 (1995). For a related discussion of the use of a contracts
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Unwarranted departures from existing law that veer in either an
under- or over-protectionist direction will lead to market distortions
that will eventually result in increased uncertainty, more litigation,
and greater costs.
Part II of this Note initiates the discussion by reviewing the
Florida District Court's decision in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena
2 5
and outlining the interpretations of that case put forth by under- and
over-protectionist commentators. Part III provides a detailed analysis
of the liability that existing copyright law calls for in BBS
transactions and disputes the interpretations of both groups of
commentators. Part III concludes that under existing copyright law
individual subscribers should not be held liable for mere browsing.
By the same logic, however, it follows that copyright law does in fact
impose strict liability on sysops. Part IV examines one court's
departure from existing law in this area. In Religious Technology
Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,26 the District
Court for the Northern District of California adopted a contributory
liability approach in its treatment of a sysop. Part IV argues that this
departure from strict liability, if applied widely, would disrupt the
balance of interests achieved by the Copyright Act. In addition, Part
IV reviews aspects of the settlement reached in Frank Music Corp. v.
CompuServe Inc.27 The Frank Music settlement provides a
provocative example of market forces at work in the on-line
environment. Part IV thus evaluates the "contracts" approach to
resolving copyright issues in the on-line industry.
approach to dealing with hacking and criminal computer access issues, see Robert L. Dunne,
Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling Behavior in Cyberspace through a
Contract Law Paradigm, 35 Jurimetrics 1, 11-15 (1994).
25. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Playboy was chosen because its facts give life to
the otherwise sterile hypothetical described above. Additionally, it was the first BBS/copyright
case decided, and therefore has provided fodder for articles, comments, and criticism from a
large number of commentators and reporters as well from the White Paper.
26. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that a computer bulletin board operator
could not be held strictly liable for copyright infringements allegedly perpetrated by his
subscribers).
27. Civil Action No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Frank Music was a copyright infringe-
ment suit brought against CompuServe based upon the operation of one of its computer bulletin
boards. The case was settled by the parties on November 7, 1995, after just under two years of
litigation. See Settlement Reached in Music Publishers' Class Action Against On-Line Provider,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) A216 (Nov. 8, 1995).
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II. PLAYBOY: RECOGNITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION AND PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE/DISPLAY RIGHTS AS CORNERSTONES OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION IN ON-LINE ENVIRONMENTS
A. The Decision
In Playboy, Playboy Enterprises sued George Frena for alleged
infringement of Playboy's copyrights in its magazine photographs.2
At the time, Frena owned and operated a subscription BBS.29 At some
point in the operation of the BBS, an unknown number of Frena's
subscribers uploaded one hundred seventy digital image
reproductions of Playboy magazine photographs onto the BBS.30 In
addition, Frena admitted that each one of these files had been
downloaded by one or more of his subscribers.31 Frena claimed,
however, that he personally had never uploaded or downloaded any of
the copyrighted photographs.32 Further, he claimed ignorance and an
absence of intent to violate Playboy's copyrights."3 Despite Frena's
lack of knowledge and intent, and the fact that he himself had neither
uploaded nor downloaded any of the copyrighted material, the district
court granted Playboy's partial motion for summary judgment on the
issue of copyright infringement.u
The court began its reasoning by discussing Frena's infringe-
ment of Playboy's distribution right. The court concluded without
substantial analysis that direct infringement had occurred.
Characterizing Frena's activity as "supplying a product" that con-
tained unauthorized copies of copyrighted works, the court dismissed
as irrelevant Frena's claim that he did not make the copies himself. 5
28. 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
29. Id. For a fee, subscribers equipped with a modem could access the bulletin board.
Once logged on, subscribers could upload material from their own computers, browse through
the many directories and postings on the main computer, and download or print out material
they wanted for future use. Id. This basic method of operation is common to all the parties I
refer to with the term sysop. See note 6.
30. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1554. It seems clear that Playboy would have had a colorable
action against the subscribers to Frena's BBS who uploaded and downloaded the infringing
images. No such action was taken by Playboy, however, perhaps due to its public relations
concerns, its inability to identify these subscribers, or its belief that the pockets of individual
subscribers might not be deep enough to compensate for the damages.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1559; Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiff's First Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment (Copyright Infringement) As To Defendant Frena 2, Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
34. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
35. Id.
446 [Vol. 49:439
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This simplistic description of Frena's role was the extent of the court's
analysis of the distribution perpetrated in the BBS transaction.
36
The court next discussed the infringement of Playboy's exclu-
sive right to display its works publicly.37 The court first determined,
based on the legislative history of the Copyright Act, that the display
right covered the type of postings found on Frena's BBS.38 Moreover,
the court deemed the display public despite the fact that only Frena's
subscribers could access it.39 The court based this conclusion on the
fact that Frena's BBS was "open to the public,"40 and because Frena's
subscribers were largely persons outside his circle of family and
friends.
41
After dispensing with Frena's fair use defense,42 the court
concluded by stating that Playboy had presented irrefutable evidence
36. The court's failure to provide a more thoughtful and penetrating analysis has caused
many commentators to question its validity and reliability. See, for example, Elkin-Koren, 13
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. at 357, 361 (1995) (cited in note 14) (arguing that "supplying a
product" is an awkward and confusing description of the operation of a BBS).
37. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556.
38. Id. at 1556-57. For a full description of the legislative history upon which the court
relied, see notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
39. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1557.
40. Id.
41. Id. The language used by the court parallels the definition of publicly in the Copyright
Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. For the full text of the definition and a more detailed discussion of its
applicability to BBSs, see notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
42. The fair use defense is codified in the Copyright Act at § 107. That section allows for
some technical violations of the Act to be excused as non-infringements. The preamble to the
section establishes some uses that are presumptively fair, such as reproducing a portion of a
work for the purposes of criticism, news reporting, research, etc. Id. In addition, § 107 lists four
factors that should be evaluated by courts in determining whether a use should be considered
fair: (1) the purpose and character of the use (commercial or non-commercial), (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion of the work used, and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for the work. Id.
In Playboy, the court found that all four factors of the fair use defense weighed against the
defendant. 839 F. Supp. at 1557-59. Regarding the first factor, the court concluded that the
commercial nature of the BBS weighed against Frena. Id. at 1557-58. Second, the court
reasoned that the nature of the copyrighted work also weighed against Frena because the works
were primarily used for fantasy and entertainment, making fair use less likely. Id. at 1558.
The third factor-the amount and substantiality of the portion of the copyrighted work
used-was also decided in Playboy's favor. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court utilized a
qualitative evaluation test established by the Supreme Court. Id. (citing Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d. 829, 844 (11th Cir. 1990)). The
court concluded that "[tihere is no doubt that the photographs in Playboy magazine are an
essential part of the copyrighted work. The Court is not implying that people do not read the
articles in PEI's magazine. However, a major factor to PEI's success is the photographs in its
magazine." Id. Finally, the court concluded that the fourth factor in § 107, effect of the use
upon the potential market, weighed against Frena. Id. at 1558-59.
It is undoubted that the fair use defense will play an important role in the future develop-
ment of the on-line industry. Nonetheless, a full discussion of the nature, scope, and application
of the fair use defense as it relates to information systems is beyond the scope of this Note. An
entire conference on the fair use defense, known as CONFU, was conducted by the authors of
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of direct copyright infringement.43 The fact that Frena was unaware
of his infringing actions was irrelevant, because "even an innocent
infringer is liable for infringement."44 Thus, Playboy stands for the
proposition that when a BBS contains unauthorized copyrighted
material, the sysop of that bulletin board is strictly liable for direct
infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute its
materials and to display them publicly.45
B. Interpretations of Playboy
The under-protectionist camp claims that the Playboy court
mischaracterized the role of the sysop when it categorized Frena's
activities as a direct infringement of copyright, rather than an
indirect infringement. This mischaracterization, the argument goes,
results from a misunderstanding regarding which of the copyright
owner's rights are implicated in the BBS transaction. These critics
argue that the Playboy court should have focused upon the violations
of the reproduction right perpetrated by the individual subscribers.46
When subscriber A uploads unauthorized copyrighted material, and
subscriber C downloads the same material, in each circumstance the
subscriber has directly infringed upon the copyright owner's
the White Paper, the proceedings of which are on file with the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks. See White Paper at 83-84 (cited in note 20).
43. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
44. Id. Frena's lack of knowledge or intent distinguishes Playboy from the result reached
in a similar case, Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994). In Sega,
the defendant sysops of the MAPHIA BBS were charged with allowing unlawful distribution of
Sega's copyrighted video games. Id. at 686-87. Although the circumstances were similar to
Playboy, the Sega court concluded that the sysops had had actual intent and knowledge of the
infringements of Sega's copyrights. Id. at 683. For this reason, Sega did not reach the issue of
strict liability. Consequently, examination of Sega would not shed any further light on the
issues discussed in this Note.
45. Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559. Despite the court's limited analysis of the technological
and policy considerations, this Note argues that the court reached the correct result, as will be
demonstrated in Part III.
46. See Public Hearings (Sept. 22, 1994) at 3 (cited in note 17) (testimony of Brian Kahin,
Interactive Media Association) ("When the technological nature of the transactions in Playboy v.
Frena is properly understood as a reproduction, then it appears that the BBS operator is not an
active infringer and is not liable unless contributory infringement can be established'). For
similar interpretations, see Timothy F. Bliss, Recent Developments: Computer Bulletin Boards
and the Green Paper, 2 J. Intell. Prop. L. 537, 543-44 (1995); Dobbins, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 221-
24 (cited in note 16). For a related, yet even more under-protectionist reading of Playboy, see
Elkin-Koren, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. at 350-62, 407-410 (cited in note 14) (concluding that
sysops should not face liability when they merely have knowledge of infringing activity, but only
when they are "actively involved in copying and posting" unauthorized materials).
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reproduction right by creating an unlawful reproduction of the
material.47
The sysop, on the other hand, makes no reproductions herself,
but merely provides the means (or space) by which such infringe-
ments take place. 48 Thus, under-protectionist scholars conclude that
the sysop is not a direct infringer of the plaintiffs copyright.49 On the
contrary, the sysop is merely an unknowing contributor to the direct
infringements perpetrated by the subscribers. Therefore, proponents
of this interpretation claim that the sysop should only be liable if she
has knowledge, under a theory of contributory liability.50
The flaw in this interpretation stems from its limited view of
the rights involved in a BBS transaction. Under-protectionist
commentators accurately characterize the uploading by subscriber A
as an unlawful reproduction. Similarly, subscriber C's downloading
from the BBS is clearly an unlawful reproduction. However, an
additional step, which is ignored by under-protectionist
commentators, occurs between the reproductions made by subscribers
A and C. The sysop, whether innocently or not, has made the
unauthorized copyrighted material available to the public through her
BBS.51 The moment that the infringing material becomes available to
the public for browsing or downloading, a violation of the plaintiffs
public display and distribution rights occurs.52  Thus, it is simply
47. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text. The under-protectionist interpretation does
not state specifically that subscriber B, who browses the copyrighted material without
downloading it, should be liable for making a reproduction. In fact, it does not address liability
for the browsing activity. This absence is one of this interpretation's critical flaws, for, as will
be addressed in the next Section, the browsing subscriber who does not download is not a
copyright infringer. Thus, the only protection a copyright owner would have in such
circumstances is the display right, and the infringer would be the sysop. The under-
protectionist interpretation ignores the fundamental BBS activity of browsing and also ignores
the protection provided for it, the display right.
48. Elkin-Koren, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. at 356 (cited in note 14).
49. Dobbins, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 221-24, 230-35 (cited in note 16).
50. Id. at 236-40. For a review of the general relationship between direct and indirect
infringement, and strict and contributory liability, see notes 1-3. For examinations of current
case law addressing contributory liability outside on-line environments, see Cavazos and Chao,
4 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. J. at 17-23 (cited in note 7); David Goldberg and Robert J. Bernstein,
Contributory and Vicarious Infringement, N.Y. L. J. 3 (July 21, 1995).
51. The word innocently is meant to convey that the sysop may not have known that her
operation of the BBS was making infringing material available to the public. In addition, the
fact of public accessibility may have occurred through the sysop's own inaction.
52. In other words, subscribers B and C could not have browsed or downloaded the
copyrighted material were it not for the material's public accessibility on the BBS. Thus, the
fact that subscribers B and C are able to browse and download the material shows that the
material must have been available for public display and distribution. This point will be more
fully addressed in Part III.
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underinclusive to claim that the subscribers' infringements of the
reproduction right are the only direct infringements taking place.
In marked contrast to the foregoing interpretation, over-
protectionist scholars tend to overstate the liability contemplated by
the Copyright Act. They conclude that subscribers A (uploader), B
(browser), and C (downloader) are all liable for making infringing
reproductions. In addition, they believe the sysop is liable for
infringement of the distribution and display rights53 Although this
interpretation is not far from correct, it overstates liability in one
important respect. As will be shown in the next Section, the browsing
subscriber who does not download is not liable for copyright
infringement under the Copyright Act4 Precisely for this reason,
strict liability against the sysop is a necessary element of the
Copyright Act. Although the strict liability component of the Act is
overlooked by the under-protectionist interpretation, and glossed over
by the over-protectionist interpretation, it is nonetheless mandated by
the logic of the Act.
III. THE INTERNAL LOGIC OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT: How THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNER ARE INFRINGED IN BBS
TRANSACTIONS
A. In General
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants copyright owners a set
of specific, exclusive rights: the rights to reproduce, to distribute, to
perform publicly, to display publicly, and to prepare derivative
works.55 The House Report addressing Section 106 explains that the
53. The White Paper and concerned copyright owners have been adamant that copyright
liability attaches to all of the parties to the BBS transaction. See notes 71-75 and accompanying
text.
54. See notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
55. Section 106 expressly establishes the following rights:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:.
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending,
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and
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copyright owner holds these rights cumulatively, though they overlap
in some cases.5 6 Furthermore, the Report points out that although
each right exists and may be enforced independently, a single act of
infringement may violate more than one of these rights
simultaneously.57 Section 501(a) of the Copyright Act mandates that
anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
is an infringer of the owner's copyright.58
B. The Reproduction Right and the Public Display Right-9
Section 106 of the Copyright Act establishes the copyright
owner's reproduction right by granting the owner the exclusive right
to produce duplicate copies of the copyrighted work.6 Section 101
defines copies by reference to three essential requirements: the work
must be fixed in a material object such that it can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated.61 The fixation requirement 62 is
met only when the embodiment of a work "is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated for a period of more than a transitory duration."63 Reading
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
56. House Report at 61 (cited in note 3).
57. Id. ("A single act of infringement may violate [the rights of reproduction, derivative
works, and distribution] at once, as where a publisher reproduces, adapts, and sells copies of a
person's copyrighted work as part of a publishing venture. Infringement [also] takes place when
any one of the rights is violated: where, for example, a printer reproduces copies without selling
them or a retailer sells copies without having anything to do with their reproduction).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
59. This Section focuses on the relationship between the reproduction right and the
display right, due to the fact that Playboy involved the display of static, visual images. It
appears that the performance right (applying to aural and audiovisual works) parallels the
display right in its relationship to the reproduction right. Thus, one may substitute the
performance right at any point in the following discussion and achieve the same result.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (giving the copyright owner the exclusive right to "reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords").
61. Id. § 101 (defining copies as "material objects,... in which a work is fixed by any
method known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device"). The definition
of "phonorecords" in § 101 is substantially the same as the one for copies, except that
phonorecords are material objects in which sounds are fixed. Id.
62. See 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.02[B] at 8-28 (cited in note 3).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (giving the definition of fixed). See 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.02[B]
at 8-29 (cited in note 3). Nimmer notes that tangible embodiment in a material object and
permanent or stable fixation are two quite distinct concepts. Id. For instance, writing in the
sand at the beach creates a stable, perceivable image, but the image is not embodied in a mate-
rial object. Id. Conversely, an image that appears on a television screen is embodied in a
material object, but the image is not sufficiently permanent or stable to qualify as fixed. Id.
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these components together, a person infringes the reproduction right
only when she creates fixed copies of a work without authority; i.e.,
when she embodies a work in tangible objects such that it can be
perceived, reproduced, or communicated for more than a transitory
period. Thus, when a fixed copy has not been created, no infringe-
ment of the reproduction right has occurred.
The copyright owner also has the exclusive right to display
certain categories of copyrighted works publicly.6 Section 101 defines
the "display" of a work as the showing of a copy of the work to the
public.65 The Act states that infringement of the display right can
occur either directly, as in the case of the display of a painting in a
museum, or indirectly, through the use of mechanical equipment such
as a television, projection machine, or other device.66 Even if one's
activities meet this description, though, infringement will not be
found unless the display was done publicly.
6 7
The display right complements the protection afforded the
copyright owner by the reproduction right. As discussed above, the
reproduction right only protects the copyright owner from the unlaw-
ful creation of fixed copies of the original work. This threshold of
infringing activity is fairly high and does not fully protect the
copyright owner from other market-infringing, exploitative uses of the
work.68 Consequently, the display right takes over where the repro-
duction right leaves off and protects the copyright owner from unlaw-
ful showings of the work.69 The threshold of infringing activity for
Thus, in neither case has a copy been created, and in neither case has a reproductive activity
taken place.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (stating that the copyright owner has the exclusive right, "in the
case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly').
65. Id. § 101 (stating that to display a work is to "show a copy of it, either directly or by
means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process").
66. Id.
67. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.20[A] at 8-274 (cited in note 3). See id. § 8.14[C] at 8-169
(discussing the public requirement in the context of the performance right: "It would, of course,
be unthinkable for an infringement to arise every time someone for his own amusement, or that
of his friends, were to read a book aloud, or sing a song").
68. House Report at 63 (cited in note 3) (noting that "performances and displays are
continuing to supplant markets for printed copies").
69. See Copyright Law Revision, Part 6: Supplementary Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 20 (1965). As far back in the copyright revision process as 1965, copyright experts
recognized the need for a display right to supplement the reproduction right:
It is not inconceivable that, in certain areas at least, "exhibition" may take over from
"reproduction" of "copies" as the means of presenting authors' works to the public, and
we are now convinced that a basic right of public exhibition should be expressly recog-
nized in the statute.
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violating the display right is somewhat lower, as it does not require
fixation in a material object. On the other hand, the display right is
subject to a greater limitation; it only applies to displays that are
public.70
The White Paper, in its haste to overstate the rights of copy-
right owners,71 draws some inaccurate conclusions in applying the
reproduction and display rights to the browsing function 72 in a BBS
transaction. In sum, the White Paper concludes that the reproduction
right and the display right are simultaneously infringed when a sub-
scriber browses an infringing work. First, the White Paper asserts
that the browsing subscriber makes a fixed copy of the work in her
computer when she browses it without downloading.73 Then, six
pages later in the report, the White Paper characterizes the sysop as
an infringer of the display right under identical circumstances74 The
White Paper then claims, with some confidence, that "the law itself
clearly.., defines such acts [browsing] as implicating the display and
reproduction rights."7 5
The authors of the White Paper have ignored the fact that a
transmitted image cannot simultaneously constitute both a display
and a reproduction. The words "reproduction" and "display," as
Id.
Congressional concern for providing the copyright owner with protection beyond the repro-
duction right is also reflected in the public perfomance right. A songwriter's copyright would be
severely limited if it protected only against the copying of sheet music or recordings. For her
right to be meaningful, such a copyright owner requires protection from the unlawful public
performance of her work in addition to the material object in which it is fixed.
70. For a description of the public requirement, see text accompanying notes 102-106. The
public requirement effectively preserves the right of individual members of the public to use the
work privately, while at the same time protecting the copyright owner from unauthorized
commercial exploitation of the work. Paul Goldstein, 2 Copyright § 5.7.2 at 5:130 (Little, Brown,
2d ed. 1996). See also L. Ray Patterson and Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A
Law of Users' Rights 154, 193-96 (U. Georgia, 1991) (recognizing the importance of the public's
right to personal use and discussing the role of the public requirement in allowing protection of
only the copyright owner's market interest).
71. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
72. For a description of the browsing function, see note 8.
73. White Paper at 66 (cited in note 20). The White Paper proclaims that "[u]nder current
technology, when an end-user ... [browses) a file resident on another computer such as a BBS
or Internet host, a copy of at least the portion viewed is made in the user's computer." Id.
(emphasis added).
74. Id. at 72. The White Paper states the following about the display right:
The right to display a work publicly is extremely significant in the context of the
NII.... The definition of "display" clearly encompasses, for instance, the actions of the
defendant BBS operator in the Playboy case. Thus, when any NII user visually
"browses" through copies of works in any medium..., a public display of at least a por-
tion of the browsed work occurs.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
75. Id. at 72 n.226.
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defined in the Act, refer to two fundamentally different activities. As
noted above, reproduction refers to the unlawful creation of new
copies of the work, while display refers merely to a showing of the
work.
In addition to the express text of the Act, the House Report
describes reproduction and display as distinguishable rights.76  The
House Report states that the key distinction between reproduction
and display is the fixation requirement. As noted above, the fixation
requirement constitutes the primary means for determining whether
or not a copy has been made. 7 When an infringing party creates a
new, fixed copy of the work, then a violation of the reproduction right
has occurred. On the other hand, when a work is displayed, the
display itself constitutes merely a transitory representation of the
work (i.e., the display is not itself fixed), and the action falls under the
display right. The House Report reveals congressional intent with
regard to the reproduction and display rights: Congress intended that
the rights be mutually exclusive7 and intended that fixation or non-
fixation be the crucial question in determining which of the two ac-
tions had occurred, a reproduction or a display. If the work is fixed, it
is a reproduction, and if the work is not fixed, it is a display. It
cannot be both simultaneously
9
76. House Report at 62 (cited in note 3). The House Report provides the following
explanation:
"Reproduction" under clause (1) of section 106 is to be distinguished from "display"
under clause (5). For a work to be "reproduced," its fixation in tangible form must be
"sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."
Id. (emphasis added).
77. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.02[B] at 8-28-29 (cited in note 3). See Jay Dratler, Jr.,
Intellectual Property Law: Commercial, Creative, and Industrial Property § 6.01[2] at 6-6 (Law
Journal Seminars, 1994) (noting that the statutory requirement for fixation distinguishes the
reproduction right from the public display right).
78. Earlier in the Report, Congress states that the rights "may overlap in some cases."
House Report at 61 (cited in note 3). See text accompanying notes 56-57. The language in the
House Report, however, states that reproduction "is to be distinguished from display." House
Report at 62. See note 76. In addition, the reproduction and display rights were designed with
different activities in mind. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text. These two facts indicate
that the reproduction right and the display right were not meant to overlap.
79. The White Paper asserts that one should ignore the fixation distinction between the
reproduction and display rights as it is established in the House Report. White Paper at 72
n.226 (cited in note 20). It contends that this distinction between the two rights is now obsolete
because the House Report was written before the advent of the personal computer. Id. Under
that logic, though, the bulk of the 1976 Copyright Act should probably also be deemed obsolete.
Such an approach would seem to go far beyond the "Minor clarification" that the White Paper
ostensibly hopes to accomplish, id. at 17, and is the very sort of loose and one-sided interpretive
method that has prompted attack from the under-protectionist camp, see note 21; John Perry
Barlow, Property and Speech: Who Owns What You Say in Cyberspace?, 38 Comm. of the ACM
19, 20-21 (Dec. 1995).
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The White Paper's interpretation of browsing overstates the
liability contemplated by the Copyright Act. The copyright owner
cannot simultaneously have an action against the sysop for making a
public display and an action against the subscriber for making a
reproduction. The copyright owner may in fact have a cause of action
against the sysop for publicly displaying a work without authority. If
that is the case, though, the image of the work must be un-fixed in the
subscriber's computer. If it were fixed, the image would no longer be
a display, but would instead constitute a reproduction. Likewise, if
the subscriber has fixed the work in her computer, the copyright
owner might have an action against that individual subscriber for
making an infringing reproduction. But if that is the case, the
copyright owner has no action against the sysop for making a public
display.
C. Browsing as a Display and not a Reproduction
The preceding Section demonstrated that browsing cannot
simultaneously violate both a copyright holder's reproduction right
and her display right under the current Copyright Act. This Section
argues that browsing is more properly construed as implicating the
display right, rather than the reproduction right. To explain why this
conclusion is called for, this Section first considers the opposing view,
that browsing constitutes a reproduction.
The authors of the White Paper base their view that browsing
implicates the reproduction right upon the 1978 Final Report of the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (the "CONTU Final Report"),80 and subsequent interpretive
case law.81 The CONTU Final Report was drafted to address the ap-
plicability of the Copyright Act to software and computer technology.
82
The Report stated that the inputting of a copyrighted work into the
memory of a computer constituted a reproduction of the work.83
80. See National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final
Report (July 31, 1978). Relevant portions of the CONTU Final Report are reprinted in Robert
A. Gorman and Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties: Cases and Materials 686-95
(Michie, 4th ed. 1993).
81. See White Paper at 65 n.202 (cited in note 20).
82. See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 Duke L. J. 663, 665 & n.1, 694-95
(providing extensive legislative background on the CONTU Final Report).
83. CONTU Final Report, reprinted in Gorman and Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties
at 693 (cited in note 80) ('CThe introduction of a work into a computer memory would, consistent




Subsequent to the CONTU Final Report, several cases have been
decided that expand upon this fairly simple and uncontroversial
conclusion. These cases have held that the running of a computer
program, which inevitably requires the booting of the program from
hard drive or floppy disk into the random access memory ("RAM")84 of
the computer, involves the creation of a fixed copy of the program into
RAM.85
Based upon these sources, the White Paper concludes that
browsing copyrighted works on a BBS creates a reproduction in a
subscriber's computer. The White Paper reasons as follows: (1) the
CONTU Final Report states that putting a work into computer mem-
ory constitutes the making of a copy, (2) cases subsequent to the
Report have found that the booting of a computer program from a
hard drive to RAM constitutes the making of a copy, therefore, (3) any
time any digital information is contained in RAM memory, a fixed
copy has been created,86 and finally (4) because browsing involves the
use of RAM memory, browsing creates a reproduction in the user's
RAM of the file residing on the BBS.87
A number of distinguishing factors render the leap made by
the White Paper in steps (3) and (4) problematic. First of all, it is
unclear whether the authors of the CONTU Final Report intended
that a temporary RAM version of a work should be construed as a
fixed copy. The general language in the CONTU Final Report merely
refers to the introduction of a work into the memory of a computer; it
is unclear whether this reference includes introductions into RAM
84. RAM is an essential computer component which allows for the interaction between a
computer user and the software that is stored permanently either on a floppy disk or the
computer's hard drive. When a user wants to run a program, the user calls the program up
from storage into RAM, where she can engage the program. During this process, the program is
temporarily reproduced in RAM while the user is running the program. The moment that the
user stops running the program, or when the computer is turned off, the temporary RAM
version is erased and not saved.
85. See, for example, MA Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th
Cir. 1993); Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp., 845 F. Supp.
356, 365-66 (E.D. Va. 1994).
This view that RAM copies of computer programs are fixed copies under the Copyright Act
has prevailed in judicial opinions despite the fact that MAI Systems, 991 F.2d at 519, the
leading case on the issue, has been vigorously criticized. See, for example, Michael E. Johnson,
Note, The Uncertain Future of Computer Software Users' Rights in the Aftermath of MAI
Systems, 44 Duke L. J. 327, 333-36 (1994).
86. White Paper at 65 (cited in note 20) ("When a work is placed into a computer, whether
on a disk, diskette, ROM, or other storage device or in RAM for more than a very brief period, a
copy is made").
87. Id. at 66 (concluding that in browsing a work resident on a BBS, a copy of at least the
portion viewed is made in the user's computer: "Without such copying into the RAM or buffer of
the user's computer, no screen display would be possible").
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alone.8 The entire tenor of the Report conveys that its authors were
concerned with protecting against the duplication of permanent copies
of works by computer. For example, the Report explains that to
satisfy the requirements of the fair use defense, an unauthorized
researcher or other user must destroy any copies of works created
after completion of the research project or other use.89 However, users
need only intentionally destroy or erase created works when the
works are permanently fixed in a computer's hard drive or on a disk.
When a work is placed only in RAM, the "copy" is automatically
destroyed the moment the machine is turned off.
The notion that RAM-only versions of works constitute repro-
ductions under the Copyright Act stemmed from cases construing the
CONTU Final Report.90 These cases, however, are distinguishable in
that they only address the booting of computer programs.91 Computer
programs are unique in copyright law in that they enjoy no protection
from non-fixed use in the way that, for example, pictorial/textual
works and musical/audiovisual works do. Whereas the Copyright Act
protects a pictorial work from unfixed public display by the display
right, and a musical work from unfixed public performance by the
performance right, computer programs neither qualify as displayable
or performable works under the Copyright Act, nor do they have any
non-fixation right that is analogous to the display and performance
rights.92 Thus, the Copyright Act provides protection for computer
programs only in the reproduction right.
88. See Johnson, 44 Duke L. J. at 334 (cited in note 85) ("There is... little support for the
proposition that CONTU intended to create liability under the Copyright Act for the mere act of
loading a program into RAM"). MAT Systems itself expressed that it was "troubled" by the fact
that none of the authorities upon which it relied, including the CONTU Final Report, had ever
stated or held that a RAM version of a program, by itself, constituted a fixed copy. 991 F.2d at
519.
89. CONTU Final Report, reprinted in Gorman and Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties
at 693-94 (cited in note 80).
90. Samuelson, 37 Comm. of the ACM at 22 (cited in note 21).
91. See MAI Systems, 991 F.2d at 518 (examining copyright infringement in the booting of
an operating system into RAM for the purposes of repair); MA! Systems, 845 F. Supp. at 361
(examining copyright infringement in the booting of diagnostic software and an operating
system into RAM for purposes of service and repair).
92. For a number of reasons, many commentators have observed that computer programs
are radically different from the other forms of literary and artistic property that are protected
by copyright law. See, for example, Samuelson, 1984 Duke L. J. at 705-54 (cited in note 82);
Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell Kapor, and J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2315-32 (1994). These
commentators conclude that, in many respects, copyright law is simply an "inappropriate
vehicle" for the protection of computer programs. Samuelson, Davis, Kapor, and Reichman, 94
Colum. L. Rev. at 2347-56; J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-
How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 Vand. L.
Rev. 639, 671-700 (1989).
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This gap in the protection of computer programs may explain
why courts have stretched the notion of reproduction to embrace a
transitory RAM version of a computer program.93 As a result of this
expansion of the reproduction right, under current law it is
conceptually impossible to run a non-fixed version of a computer
program. As a practical matter, however, it is quite possible to see a
non-fixed display or hear a non-fixed performance of an artistic or
musical work. Because the cases to date have only dealt with
computer programs, it is problematic to assert that any browsable
RAM-only version of a copyrighted work constitutes a reproduction9 4
The text of the Copyright Act itself suggests that browsing is
more properly characterized as a display rather than a reproduction.
As discussed above, the reproduction right is not triggered unless a
fixed copy is created.95 Moreover, a copy is not fixed unless it is
"sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a
transitory duration.''96 When a user browses a pictorial or textual
work, in contrast, the image resides in the user's RAM for a transitory
period.9 7 The moment the user disengages her power or her contact
93. It may be that the MA! Systems court and the other courts following its interpretation
were seeking to fill the gaps in protection for computer programs and to prevent inequitable
losses to copyright owners. For a similar analysis, see Katrine Levin, Note, MAI v. Peak,
Should Loading Operating System Software into RAM Constitute Copyright Infringement?, 24
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 649, 681-682 (1994) (observing that the equities of the situation may
have compelled the court to rule in favor of the plaintiff).
94. A number of commentators have criticized the notion that browsing constitutes a re-
productive activity. In particular, Professor Samuelson puts the White Paper's conclusion in
perspective in the following passage:
Proponents of the view that RAM copies infringe the copyrights argue that as long as
the machine is on-and it can be on indefinitely-a copy of the copyrighted work stored
there can be perceived or reproduced, thereby satisfying the "more than transitory du-
ration" standard. (By this logic, holding a mirror up to a book would be infringement
because the book's image could be perceived there f6r more than a transitory duration,
i.e., however long one has the patience to hold the mirror.)
Samuelson, 37 Comm. of the ACM at 22-23 (cited in note 21). See Litman, 13 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L. J. at 42 (cited in note 21) ('I would argue that the better view of the law is that the act of
reading a work into a computer's random access memory is too transitory to create a reproduc-
tion within the meaning of section 106(1)" (citation omitted)); Elkin-Koren, 13 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L. J. at 382 (cited in note 14) (claiming that "the view that loading information into a
computer's RAM creates a 'copy' eviscerates the fixation requirement.... Such an interpreta-
tion extends the meaning of 'copying' to include the creation of both permanent and transitory
duplications, and covers any information captured momentarily in the working memory of a
computer" (citations omitted)); David Post, New Wine, Old Bottles: The Evanescent Copy, Am.
Lawyer 103-04 (May 1995) (discussing the conceptual problems in characterizing browsing as a
reproductive activity).
95. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (giving the definition of fixed) (emphasis added).
97. Functionally, browsing works on a BBS is similar to watching television. In both
cases, the transitory, ephemeral image appears at the recieving end of the transmission (the
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with the host computer, the image disappears.98 Only when the user
prints or downloads does she create a fixed reproduction. 9
In addition to the express text of the Copyright Act, the legisla-
tive history strongly suggests that Congress intended the display
right to cover activities like browsing. The House Report states that
the display right includes electronic transmissions of images in
connection with any sort of information storage and retrieval
system.100 This description in the House Report seems to contemplate
the browsing activity of a BBS user.'10 A user retrieves information
through her computer from a BBS, which probably qualifies as an
information storage facility. Further, the image that the user
retrieves, be it textual, pictorial, or aural, is then transmitted to her
computer via "electronic or other means." Because the browsing
activity so closely resembles the activity described in the House
television or the user's computer), and the fixed copy resides at the sending end (the television
station or the BBS). With a television, when the viewer changes the channel or turns the
television off, the image is gone. Similarly, on a user's computer, once the user changes files,
ends her contact with the BBS, or turns off her computer, the image vanishes.
98. See Litman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. at 41 n.57 (cited in note 21) ("A work's
appearance in RAM is, by its nature, temporary; the work will disappear from RAM when the
computer is turned off); David J. Loundy, E-Law 2.0: Computer Information Systems Law and
System Operator Liability Revisited *77 (copy on file with the Author) ("[If someone connects to
the computer information system and just peruses the archives, if the information is not
'downloaded,' 'screen captured,' or otherwise recorded on computer disk, tape, or printout, then
no fixation is made and thus, no copy").
99. When printing or downloading, the user clearly produces a fixed copy that is a perma-
nent and stable reproduction that can be perceived for more than a transitory period.
Stating that browsing results in a fixed reproduction in the user's computer is simply an
awkward and inelegant reading of the Act. Professor Litman notes that
the Draft Report itself seems a little confused about this; compare IITF Green Paper,
supra note 8, at 14 ("A transmission is not a fixation. While a transmission may result
in a fixation, a work is not fixed by virtue of the transmission alone'), with id. at 36
("[W]hen a computer simply 'browses' a document resident on another's computer, the
image on the user's screen exists-under contemporary technology-only by virtue of
the copy that has been reproduced in the user's computer memory" (emphasis in
original)).
Litman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. at 42-43 n.64 (cited in note 21). Juxtaposition of these
passages begs the question: what kind of a transmission would not be fixed, if basic browsing,
without downloading, constitutes fixation?
100. House Report at 63 (cited in note 3). The express language of the House Report is as
follows:
The corresponding definition of "display" covers any showing of a "copy" of the work,
"either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or
process"... In addition to the direct showings of a copy of a work, 'display' would in-
clude the projection of an image on a screen or other surface by any method, the trans-
mission of an image by electronic or other means, and the showing of an image on a
cathode ray tube, or similar viewing apparatus connected with any sort of information
storage and retrieval system.
fd. (emphasis added).
101. It was this language upon which the Playboy court based its finding of copyright
infringement of the display right. See 839 F. Supp. at 1556.
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Report, it is likely that Congress intended the display right to cover
such activities.
The public nature of BBSs also suggests that browsing ac-
tivities on a BBS fall under the public display right. In its definition
of displaying a work publicly, the Act mentions both direct displays
and, in the second clause, displays that are transmitted to the public
by means of electronic devices or processes.10 2 In this second clause,
the Act explains that the public requirement is satisfied even where
members of the public receive such transmissions in separate places
and at separate times. 103 Almost all BBSs satisfy this requirement.
First, BBS subscribers qualify as members of the public. A public
display merely requires that such display be open to the public. 104
Thus, the fact that some BBSs and services charge a fee for access
does not render them non-public. 0 5 Second, the subscribers receive
the display in separate places, that is, at each individual's own
computer, whether at home, school, or work. Finally, BBS subscrib-
ers are capable of receiving the transmission at the same or different
102. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Act offers the following definition:
To perform or display a work "publicly" means-
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social ac-
quaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in
the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. It seems clear that the Act views a television or radio broadcast as public in na-
ture. However, the language in the definition of publicly goes beyond television and radio in its
description. Television and radio broadcasts, although received by members of the public at
separate places, are generally received at the same time throughout the broadcast area. By
including transmission systems that are capable of being received by members of the public at
separate places and separate times, the Act envisions more than television and radio. This view
is bolstered by language in the House Report, explaining that the Act's concept of transmission
"is broad enough to include all conceivable forms and combinations of wired and wireless
communications media, including but by no means limited to radio and television broadcasting
as we know them." House Report at 64 (cited in note 3).
104. See 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.14[C] at 8-173 (cited in note 3) (discussing the public
requirement). See also House Report at 64 (cited in note 3) (stating that one of the primary
purposes for the inclusiveness of the definition was to make clear that any displays "open to the
public" or "semipublic," in other words, any group of people "outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances," were covered). In addition, the House Report makes clear
that the public display right is triggered even though there is no proof that any of the potential
recipients of the display actually viewed it. Id. at 65. Thus, the moment the display becomes
open to the public, the right is triggered and liability attaches (assuming the display was
unauthorized and no defenses are available).
105. The House Report makes clear that a display is public even though "the potential
recipients of the transmission represent a limited segment of the public, such as the occupants
of hotel rooms or the subscribers of a cable television service." House Report at 65 (cited in note
3).
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times.106 This close resemblance between the description provided in
the Act and the actual operation of a BBS suggests that the public
display right was intended to govern BBS browsing.
In addition to the language in the Act and the legislative his-
tory supporting characterization of browsing as a display rather than
a reproduction, commentators have remarked upon the unique appli-
cability of the display right to browsing-type functions. The Nimmer
treatise, for instance, states that the true importance of the display
right is in its applicability to computer browsing.17 Such activity,
according to the Nimmer treatise, simply does not implicate the
reproduction right at all, and would not be infringing but for the
display right.10 8  This conclusion in the Nimmer treatise is
particularly informative in light of the fact that Melville Nimmer was
one of the predominant commissioner/authors of the CONTU Final
Report.109 Thus, at least one author of the Report was not of the
opinion that all browsing constitutes a reproduction. The foundation
for the White Paper's reliance upon the CONTU Final Report for such
authority is therefore diminished.
Two additional reasons exist for construing browsing as a
display rather than a reproduction. The first is a functional consid-
eration. After a browsing transaction is complete, the user has no
permanent copy of the copyrighted work.110 Thus, the copyright
owner's fear that permanent copies may be made without remunera-
106. Displays would usually occur at different times, as each subscriber logs on to the BBS
at her convenience. Receipt could of course be simultaneous, though, depending on how many
users can log on at once (which in turn depends upon how many telephone lines support the
operation of the BBS). Small BBSs generally have only a few dedicated phone lines, but some of
the very large service providers can support hundreds of users simultaneously. Loundy, E-Law
2.0 at *9 (cited in note 98).
107. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.20[A] at 8-276 (cited in note 3).
[T]he important function of the display right... can be found in its application to the
transmission of the manuscript or printed version of such works [or, presumably, the
pictorial version] so that they may be read [or viewed] by electronic means on cathode
ray tubes or otherwise through computer technology. This does not involve an infringe-
ment of the reproduction right, nor does it constitute a performance of the work. Such
conduct would become infringing only by reason of the display right.
Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. See also Dratler, Intellectual Property Law § 6.01[4] at 6-20 to 6-21 (cited in note
77) (noting that the display right is of "great importance" to the works to which it applies
because "[olur information society is rapidly replacing paper and other tangible copies with
intangible transmissions and displays of recorded information, whether for viewing at a single
time or repeatedly on demand. As transmitted information grows in commercial value,
the ... display rights assume even greater economic and social importance).
109. See Samuelson, 1984 Duke L. J. at 665-66 & 695 n.128 (cited in note 82) (listing




tion to the copyright owner has not been realized. One copy originally
existed in the memory banks of the BBS before the transaction, and
one copy exists after the transaction is complete. Viewed at the macro
level, this activity simply does not constitute the type of behavior that
the reproduction right was designed to prevent.1 '
Finally, one policy-related reason supports construing brows-
ing as a display rather than a reproduction. As Jessica Litman has
observed, copyright law does not give the copyright owner exclusive
control over every single use of her work by every individual."2 The
law does not hold individuals liable merely for viewing, reading, or
listening to an unauthorized copyrighted work."1 Thus, a museum or
movie patron may view an unauthorized work at a museum or movie
theater without incurring liability under the Copyright Act. The
Copyright Act does not hold an individual liable for merely experienc-
ing an unauthorized copyrighted work so long as, when the transac-
tion is complete, the individual has not made an unauthorized per-
manent reproduction of the work. For this reason, browsing is more
properly construed as a display rather than a reproduction.
D. The Sysop as the Party Responsible for the Display
Copyright law places liability on the party responsible for
making the display or performance available to the public, not on the
individual viewer. In the above example, the parties making the
unauthorized display or performance available-the museum and the
movie theater-were the responsible parties. If no defenses were
available, these parties would incur liability.114 Because the copyright
owner could not sue the individuals for viewing the works, her only
recourse would be against the parties responsible for the public
display or performance.
111. Review of the right analogous to the display right, the performance right, further
highlights the improbability of the White Paper's position regarding browsing. When a user
browses a musical work by merely listening to it (without downloading it), such activity involves
a performance rather than a reproduction. Even if the user plays the work over and over again,
one would not deem it permanently fixed in her computer until she actively downloads it. The
work's presence on her computer is only of transitory duration until she creates a permanent
copy of it in her hard drive.
112. See Litman, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. at 35 (cited in note 21).
113. As the CONTU Final Report says, 'The way copyright affects games and game-playing
is closely analogous: one may not adopt and republish or redistribute copyrighted game rules,
but the copyright owner has no power to prevent others from playing the game." CONTU Final
Report, reprinted in Gorman and Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties at 688 (cited in note 80).
114. See House Report at 79-80 (cited in note 3) (implying that the unlawful display of a
work, either directly as in the case of a museum or gallery, or indirectly through projection or
transmission, results in liability for the responsible party).
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A copyright decision from the District Court for the Northern
District of California illustrates this notion in a setting resembling a
BBS transaction. In On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries,115 a hotel provided video transmissions of movies for the
benefit of its guests.116 The hotel employed a computerized transmis-
sion system and a bank of video cassette players centrally located in
the hotel's equipment room.'17 Guests, operating the system from
their rooms by remote control, could choose among the available
movies, and then the audiovisual image was transmitted to the
television in the guest's room." 8 The case was ultimately decided
against the hotel based on the public performance right,119 but the
significance of this case to this discussion lies in the fact that the
copyright owner had no right of action against the individual guests
who had viewed the movies. The guests were mere browsers; thus,
the only recourse available to the copyright owner was suing the party
responsible for making the works publicly available.120
In a BBS transaction, the situation for the copyright owner is
similar. When a subscriber browses works on a BBS without creating
permanent reproductions, the copyright owner has no right of action
against the subscriber. The Copyright Act dictates that the copyright
owner pursue the party responsible for making the displayed work
available to the public, rather than the individual members of the
public viewing the display.' 21 In a BBS setting, this party is the
sysop. Just as bookstores, record stores, libraries, museums,
newsstands, and the hotel in On Command Video are responsible for
the materials they carry and make available to the public, the sysop is
responsible for the materials she stores and makes available to the
public. Only through her operation of the BBS does the work in
question become publicly available for browsing.
The preceding analysis has argued for recognition of three
specific points. First, Part III.B demonstrated that the reproduction
and public display rights are mutually exclusive, as they were
designed to address fundamentally different activities. Part III.C
then explained that, for a variety of reasons, browsing on a BBS is
115. 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
116. Id. at 788.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 789-91.
120. See also Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 159-60 (holding a video rental store liable for
allowing public performance or "showcasing" of movies in individual exhibition booths in the
rear of the premises).
121. See notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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more properly construed as implicating the public display right than
the reproduction right. Finally, Part III.D reasoned that, because
browsing implicates the public display right, the Copyright Act places
liability, not upon members of the public, but upon the party
responsible for making the display available to the public. That party
is the sysop. Part III.E, which follows, makes a similar argument in
the context of the distribution right.
E. The Distribution Right
As noted above, the Copyright Act grants to copyright owners
the exclusive right to distribute copies of the work to the public. 122
The broad language of the statute applies to the transfer of almost
any interest in the work, whether that transfer be by sale, gift, loan,
or rental or lease arrangement. 123 The scope of the distribution right,
however, is limited in a manner similar to the display right; only
distributions to the public trigger the right.124 In addition, the distri-
bution right is significantly limited by the first sale doctrine, as
embodied in Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act.125 The first sale doc-
trine essentially eliminates the copyright owner's ability to control the
subsequent alienation of the copyrighted work (or a particular copy of
the copyrighted work) once an initial valid transfer has taken place.
26
The first sale doctrine only applies, however, if the original sale or
transfer constituted a legitimate transfer of an authorized copy.
27
The copyright owner's distribution rights would therefore remain
122. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). Under the Act, the copyright owner has the exclusive right "to dis-
tribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." Id. The House Report also states that the copyright
owner has the right to control the "first public distribution" of any authorized copy of her work.
House Report at 62 (cited in note 3).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 109(a). This provision states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord.
Id.
126. "As section 109 makes clear,.., the copyright owner's rights under section 106(3)
cease with respect to a particular copy or phonorecord once he has parted with ownership of it."
House Report at 62 (cited in note 3).
It is important to note, however, that the first sale doctrine only limits the copyright owner's
rights when she has transferred an ownership interest in the work. Thus, a rental or lease
agreement would not "exhaust" the distribution right through first sale.
127. Marshall A- Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law § 8.13 at 220-21 (Matthew Bender,
1989). See House Report at 62 (cited in note 3) ("[Amny unauthorized public distribution of
copies or phonorecords that were unlawfully made would be an infringement").
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intact in the case of any distribution of unlawfully made copies,
whether it be the first, second, or thirtieth actual conveyance.
128
Similar to the problems arising in connection with the repro-
duction and display rights, application of the distribution right to
BBSs gives rise to interpretive difficulties. First, it is unclear exactly
what actions are necessary to trigger copyright infringement of the
distribution right. Some authorities have identified an offering of the
work to the public for distribution as the triggering event.129 Under
this standard, merely making the work available to the public for
distribution could constitute infringement."30 This standard suggests
that an infringement might occur even absent any actual transfers of
copies or of works.'
3'
The Nimmer and Goldstein treatises, in contrast, claim that
infringement of the distribution right requires an actual
dissemination of copies of the work. 32 Under this standard, a mere
offering of copies of the work to members of the public, by itself, would
128. Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law § 8.13[A] at 221 (cited in note 127) ("Any resale
or other disposition of a pirated copy would constitute an infringing act even if the defendant
had no knowledge of the piracy").
129. See, for example, Wildlife Internationale, Inc. v. Clements, 591 F. Supp. 1542, 1547
(S.D. Ohio 1984) (stating that an "offer of sale to the public or otherwise" could constitute
copyright infringement). This is also the interpretation of the distribution right specifically
endorsed by David Loundy in the context of BBSs. See Loundy, E-Law 2.0 at *77 (cited in note
98) (claiming that if a user uploads unauthorized copyrighted material to the BBS, and the BBS
operator makes the file accessible to other users, the BBS operator has infringed the copyright
owner's distribution right, regardless of whether the material is ever actually downloaded by
other users). In addition, such an interpretation comports precisely with the law of the United
Kingdom, which holds that "making a work available to the public by means of an electronic
retrieval system constitutes publication." White Paper at 219 n.548 (cited in note 20) (citing the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988 § 175(1)(b)).
130. Such a standard resembles the definition of publication established in the Act, which
provides that, under some circumstances, an offer can be sufficient to trigger the distribution
right. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that where the purpose is for further distribution, performance,
or display, an offer alone can constitute publication of a work). Commentator Jay Dratler
argues that the language in the statute as well as language in the House Report indicate that
the publication standard itself should be used to decide whether distribution has occurred.
Dratler, Intellectual Property Law § 6.01[3][a] at 6-13 (cited in note 77). First, "the statute
defines the term 'publication' in almost the exact same language that it uses to express the
distribution right." Id. Second, the House Report twice refers to the distribution right as
"publication" or the "exclusive right of publication." Id. Based on these pieces of evidence,
Dratler concludes: "No doubt Congress also intended this language to determine what activities
would and would not infringe the copyright holder's exclusive distribution right." Id.
131. This would seem to correspond to the House Report's interpretation of the display
right, see note 103 and accompanying text, where the display right may be infringed merely by
virtue of being open or available to the public, whether or not such display is ever actually
viewed by users.
132. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[A] at 8-137 (cited in note 3) (citing National Car Rental
System, Inc. v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993)); Goldstein, 2
Copyright § 5.5.1 at 5:102 (cited in note 70) (stating that "an actual transfer must take place; a
mere offer of sale will not violate the right").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
not suffice to trigger the distribution right.3 3 The copyright owner
would also have to prove that actual transfers to members of the
public had taken place.
Defining when infringement takes place is important in the
context of BBSs. Under the offer standard, a sysop could incur
liability by making an unauthorized work available to the public for
downloading from the BBS.34 Under the actual dissemination stan-
dard, on the other hand, a sysop must actually disseminate copies of
the copyrighted work. The plaintiff would therefore have to prove
that downloading of the material had actually taken place."35
The actual dissemination standard is problematic for two
reasons. First, the sources that the Nimmer and Goldstein treatises
rely upon in support of the standard do not actually state that an offer
alone cannot trigger the distribution right. One of the three cases
cited, Greenbie v. Noble, 36 was decided prior to the enactment of the
1976 Copyright Act and was based upon the "right to vend" embodied
in the 1909 Act. 37 Greenbie states only that an offer was insufficient
under the former Act to trigger the now-repealed right to vend. The
Nimmer treatise itself notes that the distribution right in the current
Act is broader than the right to vend in the 1909 Act.1 38 Moreover, the
Nimmer treatise admits that the distribution right was arguably
intended to encompass both the former right to vend and the former
right to publish.13 9 Thus, reliance upon Greenbie for an actual
dissemination standard under the 1976 Act is dubious.
Furthermore, neither of the other two cases cited, Obolensky v.
G.P. Putnam's Sons49 nor National Car Rental System, Inc. v.
Computer Associates Intern., Inc.,141 says anything about the suffi-
133. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[A] at 8-135 n.2 (cited in note 3) (noting that an offer is
"apparently" not enough to trigger the distribution right).
134. See Loundy, E-Law 2.0 at *77 (cited in note 98) (stating that once the digital file of a
copyrighted work is available in a publicly accessible BBS archive, the sysop has violated the
copyright owner's distribution right).
135. In accordance with the preceding Sections, browsing would not qualify as actual
dissemination because in each of the transfers covered in the statute-gift, sale, rental, lease,
and so forth-an actual possessory interest is conveyed. Mere viewing would not qualify, as a
possessory interest would only arise with the creation of a permanent reproduction. See notes
109-13 and accompanying text.
136. 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
137. Id. at 63 (stating that, at that time, the copyright owner's exclusive rights included the
rights to "print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work").
138. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[A] at 8-135 n.2 (cited in note 3).
139. Id. § 8.11[A] at 8-135 to 8-136.
140. 628 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd without opinion, 795 F.2d 1005 (2nd Cir.
1986).
141. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
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ciency of an offer to trigger the distribution right. In Obolensky, the
plaintiff sued because its copyrighted book had been listed incorrectly
in Books in Print, making distribution by the plaintiff himself an
impossibility.142 The court stated that the plaintiffs claim was not
cognizable under the distribution right because the defendant had
made no sales of the book.143 The defendant, however, had never even
possessed copies of the book, much less made an offer to the public.14
Thus, the case does not support the view that offers to the public are
insufficient to trigger the distribution right.145
In National Car Rental, the court stated that infringement of
the distribution right "requires an actual dissemination of... copies"
of the work.146 In so stating, however, the court sought to emphasize
that the transfer of mere features or functions of the work was
insufficient to constitute distribution. 47 The court used the actual
copy standard to define how much of the work must be transferred to
trigger distribution, rather than to determine whether an offer
constituted a transfer sufficient to trigger distribution.48 Thus, none
of the cases cited by the Nimmer and Goldstein treatises seem to
support fully the proposition that an offer to distribute is insufficient
to trigger the distribution right.
The second problem with the view espoused by the Nimmer
and Goldstein treatises concerns the BBS context itself. If the
threshold of infringement is actual dissemination, the distribution
right only arises when BBS users download copyrighted works. This
interpretation seems unlikely. A court would probably not require the
copyright holder to wait until a copy of the work is actually
downloaded by a member of the public before recognizing an
infringement.149 Such a standard would place a strange burden of
142. 628 F. Supp. at 1555.
143. Id. at 1555-56.
144. Id. at 1555.
145. It may be that the Goldstein treatise cites Obolensky simply because the Obolensky
court cited Greenbie regarding the right to vend. See Goldstein, 2 Copyright § 5.5.1 at 5:102
n.14 (cited in note 70). The Greenbie proposition, however, played no role in the Obolensky
holding, and Obolensky does not state that an offer is insufficient to trigger the distribution
right.
146. 991 F.2d at 25. Interestingly, the Nimmer treatise only cites National Car Rental for
this proposition. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.11[A] at 8-137 n.4.7 (cited in note 3). However, the
case cites the Nimmer treatise for the proposition. National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 25.
147. National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 25. The court found that distribution of the
"functionality" of a computer program was insufficient to trigger the distribution right. Id.
148. Id.
149. Loundy's interpretation, whereby the BBS operator would violate the Act immediately
upon posting the copyrighted material, seems preferable in this respect. See note 134 and
accompanying text. Although Loundy's interpretation moves the time of infringement up, and
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proof upon a copyright owner. In order to establish infringement of
her distribution right by the sysop, she would have to show that a
user, a third party, downloaded the material.
The White Paper pinpoints the problem with making
infringement contingent upon actual dissemination: the threshold
acts for infringement-printing or downloading-more closely
resemble a reproduction by the user than a distribution by the BBS
operator. 150  For this reason, the offer standard of distribution
infringement constitutes the preferable interpretation of the law in
the BBS context. The sysop infringes the distribution right the
moment she makes it available to the public for downloading. 1'1 The
user then makes an infringing reproduction when she downloads or
prints the unauthorized material from the BBS.52
Because the White Paper tends to overstate rights,153 one may
wonder why the White Paper is unwilling to categorize downloading
by the user as both a reproduction and a distribution. The likely
reason stems from the fact that the distribution right is specifically
limited by the first sale doctrine.M As noted above, the first sale
doctrine extinguishes the copyright owner's right to control subse-
quent alienation after an initial legitimate transfer. 155 The authors of
the White Paper may have hesitated to categorize downloading as a
distribution for fear that all downloading users would obtain rights to
subsequent alienation.1. 6
The White Paper's concern, however, is misplaced. The actual
dissemination of the copy from the BBS occurs through a reproduction
by the subscriber. When the subscriber downloads or prints, she
creates a fixed copy of the work. Thus, even though a distribution has
occurred, it is the distribution of an unlawfully made reproduction.
in that sense seems harsher on the sysop, its advantage is that it places the infringing action
within the control and responsibility of the person to whom liability will attach.
150. White Paper at 68-69 (cited in note 20). As noted above, the House Report states that
a single act of infringement can violate more than one right on some occasions. See note 57 and
accompanying text.
151. As mentioned above in note 104, this view is commensurate with the display right,
which is infringed when the BBS operator makes the display available to the public for brows-
ing, regardless of whether or not such display is ever actually viewed.
152. See note 99 and accompanying text.
153. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
155. See notes 125-26.
156. The Green Paper observed that 'if a transaction by which a user obtains a 'copy' of a
work is characterized as a 'distribution,' then, under the current law, the user may be entitled to
make a like distribution without the copyright owner's permission (and without liability for
infringement [due to the first sale doctrine])." Green Paper at 39 (cited in note 20).
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As noted above, the first sale doctrine never applies to unlawfully
made reproductions.
157
F. Systematic Application of Copyright Liability
Constructs to the BBS Transaction
Each phase of a BBS transaction requires application of the
copyright principles discussed throughout Part III of this Note. The
facts of Playboy provide a workable illustration:
Step 1: Subscriber A to Frena's BBS purchases one of Playboy's
copyrighted magazines from an authorized distributor.
Because the distribution was lawful, no infringement has
occurred at this point. Due to the valid distribution,
however, Playboy loses its right to control subsequent
alienation of the magazine by operation of the first sale
doctrine. 158
Step 2: Subscriber A scans one of the pictures in Playboy's
magazine into her computer using a digital scanner.
Subscriber A is now directly liable for infringement of
Playboy's exclusive right to reproduce. 159
Step 3: Subscriber A uploads the digital image to Frena's BBS.
Subscriber A is once again directly liable for infringement
of Playboy's exclusive right to reproduce.160
Step 4: Frena, either through action or inaction, makes the image
available to his subscribers for browsing or downloading
157. See notes 127-28 and accompanying text. The more difficult question in this respect
concerns the application of the first sale doctrine when the distributed copy is a lawfully made
copy. It would still seem that the first sale doctrine should not apply because the sysop has not
disposed of her copy of the work. From a functional perspective, the first sale doctrine should
only apply when the transaction involves a single copy of the work. Only when the distributing
party sells, rents, gives, or otherwise disposes of the work to the receiving party, and the
distributing party no longer has possession of a copy at the end of the transaction, should the
first sale doctrine apply. Obviously, this will rarely be the case in the replicating medium that
is the on-line environment. See Junda Woo and Jared Sandberg, Copyright Law is Easy to
Break on the Internet, Hard to Enforce, Wall St. J. B6 (Oct. 10, 1994) (quoting noted information
technology expert Michael Wolff as commenting, regarding the Internet, "It's a replicating
medium and it's a mess"). For a further discussion of the problem with the application of the
first sale doctrine to computer environments, see White Paper at 90-95 (cited in note 20).
158. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). See notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
159. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). Subscriber A has fixed an unauthorized copy into her
computer. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text. The first sale doctrine would not apply in
this case as the distribution was of an unlawfully made reproduction. See notes 127-28, 157 and
accompanying text.
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). Subscriber A has fixed an unauthorized copy into the memory
of the BBS. If Frena knowingly induces the upload, he is a contributory infringer of Playboy's
rights. See note 3.
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through his operation of the BBS. Frena is now directly
liable for infringement of Playboy's exclusive rights to
public display161 and distribution.162 This liability attaches
regardless of whether Frena knows that the work is an
unauthorized copyrighted work,163 whether the image is
ever viewed by a user,164 and whether the image is ever
downloaded by a user.165 Moreover, if subscriber A knew
or had reason to know that the work would be made
available to the public for browsing and downloading
through the operation of Frena's BBS, she incurs con-
tributory liability regarding the infringements for which
Frena is directly responsible in the operation of his
BBS.166
Step 5: Subscriber B to Frena's bulletin board logs on, finds the
newly uploaded file, opens it, and views it without
downloading it. A display has occurred, yet it does not
trigger liability for subscriber B.
16 7
Step 6: Subscriber C logs on to the BBS, finds the image, and
downloads the image to her own computer. Subscriber C
is now a direct infringer of Playboy's exclusive right to
reproduce,68 regardless of whether she knew that the
work was an unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work.1
69
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). Frena is responsible for making a display of Playboy's
unauthorized copyrighted work available to the public. See notes 113-20.
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). Frena has made the work available for distribution to the
public. See notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
163. The ignorance or innocence of an infringer is immaterial to the attachment of liability.
See note 1.
164. See note 104. As noted above, the House Report clarifies that a public display may oc-
cur even if there is no proof that actual browsing by subscribers has occurred. House Report at
65 (cited in note 3). Thus, the moment that the material becomes available for display to
members of the public, an infringement of the display right occurs.
165. As noted above, the offer standard, rather than the actual dissemination standard, is
the better interpretation of existing law regarding the distribution right. See notes 134-152 and
accompanying text.
166. See note 3.
167. As noted above, Subscriber B cannot be held liable for merely viewing a work without
downloading it because the copyright owner does not hold the "exclusive right to read." See
notes 112-13 and accompanying text. This presumes, of course, that subscriber B is browsing
the work in an individual capacity. If subscriber B were to retrieve the image from the BBS and
then project it onto a large screen for viewing by an audience "outside of a normal circle of
family and social acquaintances," House Report at 64 (cited in note 3), she too might be liable for
making a public display. See note 103.
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). Subscriber C fixed an unauthorized copy into her computer.
See notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
169. The ignorance or innocence of an infringer is immaterial. See note 1. However, if
subscriber C is an individual making a single reproduction for personal, non-commercial use, it
is likely that this technical infringement would be excused with respect to subscriber C by the
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If Frena induced or encouraged the downloading, he is a
contributory infringer of Playboy's reproduction right.
170
A distribution has occurred, but it is not a prerequisite for
Frena's liability.1
71
As will be more fully argued below, the above principles pro-
vide a consistent framework for analyzing sysop liability.
Nonetheless, certain courts and commentators have proposed changes
to the current system that threaten to undermine the careful balance
between the competing interests that the Copyright Act represents.
IV. PROSPECTIVE IMPLICATIONS: CLARIFYING THE NEED
FOR STRICT LIABILITY
The resolutions reached in two recent cases provide good
vehicles for evaluating the advantages of maintaining the strict
liability regime that exists under current copyright law. First, a
recent federal district court decision, Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 72 helps illustrate the
pitfalls of the under-protectionist interpretation of copyright doctrine
as applied to BBSs. In this decision, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California held that contributory liability
was the proper regime for analyzing sysop liability.173 Although the
Netcom court did not acknowledge that it was making a major
departure from existing law, large-scale implementation of the
Netcom analysis would disrupt the delicate balance that copyright law
seeks to strike between the protection of a copyright owner's interests
and the public's desire for broad dissemination of artistic and literary
works.
The second resolution to be discussed is the settlement
agreement reached between the parties in Frank Music v.
CompuServe."74 The Frank Music settlement demonstrates the power
and ability parties have to define their legal relationships
fair use defense. As noted in Playboy, however, Frena, as the unlawful public displayer and
distributor, would not have access to the fair use defense. See text accompanying note 42.
170. See note 3.
171. As noted above, an offer to distribute should suffice. See notes 134-49, 162, 165 and
accompanying text.
172. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
173. Id. at 1382.
174. Civil Action No. 93 Civ. 8155 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Frank Music was settled on November
7. 1995. See note 27.
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contractually in a BBS setting. It also highlights the fact that, as a
default rule, strict liability effectively promotes and encourages such
contractual bargaining.
A. Netcom and the Problems with Departing from Strict Liability
The facts and circumstances in Netcom closely resemble the
facts of Playboy.175 In Netcom, the Religious Technology Center
("RTC") held copyrights in various texts associated with the Church of
Scientology.176 RTC brought suit against three defendants in connec-
tion with a BBS transaction.177 One defendant, Erlich, subscribed to a
BBS that was operated by a second defendant, Klemesrud. 178 Without
first obtaining authorization from RTC, subscriber Erlich uploaded
copies of RTC's texts to the BBS. 179 Klemesrud did not exercise any
control or supervision over uploads from his subscribers, and conse-
quently the works became available to other users shortly after Erlich
uploaded them.180 The third defendant, Netcom, is a large Internet
server that provided the Klemesrud BBS with access to the
Internet.18' Due to the Internet connection, the works became avail-
able to Internet users worldwide within a matter of hours.1 82
In contrast to the analysis applied by the Playboy court, the
Netcom court found that, as a matter of law, the sysop could not be
held directly liable for infringement of RTC's exclusive distribution
and display rights.' 83 The court's declaration that "[o]nly the sub-
175. One important distinction between the two is that in Netcom, the BBS was not inde-
pendent; it was connected to the Internet. Thus, additional issues arise, such as the issue of
liability for the Internet server that allowed connection to the Internet. Nonetheless, connection
to the Internet should not alter the liability analysis for the sysop of the actual BBS involved.
176. 907 F. Supp. at 1365.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 165-66.
179. Id. at 1366.
180. Id. at 1381 (noting that Kiemesrud's BBS was designed to store and distribute uploads
automatically from his subscribers to the Internet at large).
181. Id. at 1366.
182. Id. at 1368. As the Internet server, it is unclear what Netcom's liability should be in
this case. If Netcom acts as a mere information "conduit," rather than a "repository," "it would
have a good argument for an exemption [from strict liability] if it was truly in the same position
as a common carrier and could not control who or what was on its system." Id. at 1369 n.12
(citing the White Paper at 122 (cited in note 20)). Despite this argument, the Netcom court
noted that the common carrier analogy is 'not completely appropriate" as Netcom does have
some ability to control who uses its services. Id. In any event, this Note does not seek to
answer the question of Netcom's liability. Instead, this discussion focuses only upon the liability
of the sysop Klemesrud, as the sysop is the owner and operator of the BBS and is the only party
clearly responsible for its operations.
183. Id. at 1381-82.
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scriber should be liable for causing the distribution of [RTC's] work '18
provides a consummate example of the under-protectionist
interpretation. 5 The court did not believe that making the works
available to the public for browsing and downloading directly violated
RTC's copyright.186 Consequently, the court identified contributory
liability as the only theory upon which RTC could base its claim
against Klemesrud.
187
Technical and policy reasons compel the conclusion that
Netcom should not be followed in assessing the liability of a sysop in
BBS transactions of this nature.188 Most importantly, the court
ignored the role of the sysop in the infringement of RTC's copyrights.
Once the works were made available for public browsing through the
operation of the BBS, infringements of the display right occurred. 89
The operation of the BBS made such public browsing possible. 90 In
addition to the Internet connection, the works were retrievable
directly from the BBS by Klemesrud's subscribers. 19' It was only
184. Id. at 1372.
185. The court stated that "[wihere the BBS merely stores and passes along all messages
sent by its subscribers and others, the BBS should not be seen as causing these works to be
publicly distributed or displayed." Id.
186. Id. Specifically, the court stated that it was "not entirely convinced that the mere
possession of a digital copy on a BBS that is accessible to some members of the public
constitutes direct infringement by the BBS operator." Id.
187. Id. at 1372, 1381-82.
188. From the outset, it is immediately apparent that even the structure of the opinion is
unusual. The court spent the first 58 pages of the opinion addressing the liability of Netcom,
the Internet server. It then spent only five pages addressing the liability of Klemesrud, the
actual operator of the BBS. Regarding the direct liability of Kemesrud, the court merely stated
that "[t]he allegations against Klemesrud fail for the same reason the court found that Netcom
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 1381. This resolution alone is problematic
in that it is not clear that the liability analysis for both parties is identical. As noted above, one
could argue that Netcom acts merely as a conduit through which information flows as it is being
distributed or displayed to a subscriber. See note 182.
189. See notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
190. It is beyond dispute that the subscriber who uploaded the works, Erlich, made
unlawful reproductions of the works when he uploaded them to the BBS. See note 201. In
addition, it appears that Erlich is at least partially responsible for the fact that the
infringements of the public display right occurred. However, he was not the direct infringer.
Erlich did not and could not have made the works available for public display. The BBS made
the works publicly available, and Klemesrud is responsible for the actions and operations of his
BBS. Thus, Klemesrud is the direct infringer of RTC's display right. See text accompanying
notes 114-21. Erlich is more properly characterized as a contributory infringer, as he uploaded
the materials with the knowledge that the works were protected by RTC's copyright, and with
the knowledge that Klemesrud's BBS would innocently make the materials available to the
public. See note 3.
191. As noted above, the Netcom court focused its attention upon the Internet connection
through Netcom, and was unwilling to impose a "rule that could lead to the liability of countless
parties... necessary for the functioning of the Internet." 907 F. Supp. at 1372. See note 188.
This conclusion, however, ignores the role of Klemesrud's BBS in its independent capacity, aside
from the Internet. The undisputed facts revealed that the BBS had approximately 500
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through the BBS, functioning as an information storage, retrieval,
and distribution facility, that the works became publicly displayed.
As noted above, such a system was contemplated by the House Report
when it delineated the scope of the display right.
192
Additionally, the unlawful offering of the works to the public,
by virtue of their presence on the BBS, constituted a violation of the
distribution right.193 The Netcom court ignored the fact that the BBS
was the principal means through which RTC's works were distributed
to Klemesrud's subscribers and the Internet at large.194 Were it not
for Klemesrud's operation of the BBS, the works would not have been
available for unlawful downloading.195
The Copyright Act dictates that the party who is responsible
for the storage facility is responsible for the contents contained
therein. If the party chooses not to monitor those contents, she
assumes the risk that subscribers will upload unauthorized
copyrighted works.96 The sysop must take responsibility for any
works resident on the BBS that are accessible to the public for
browsing or downloading.
Beyond the mandates of existing copyright law, a number of
policy reasons exist for rejecting Netcom and maintaining strict
liability for sysops. First and foremost, the erosion of strict liability
would greatly increase the incidence of unremedied copyright
infringement.197 If courts adopted the Netcom reasoning on a large
subscribers of its own. 907 F. Supp. at 1366. Thus, aside from being a vehicle through which
works were automatically distributed to the Internet, the Kiemesrud BBS served as a direct
information storage and retrieval facility for its 500 subscribers. As regards these subscribers,
Klemesrud's actions and operations are no different from Frena's in Playboy, and liability
should be assessed in the same manner. See notes 35-45, 102-106, 158-71 and accompanying
text. Although the Internet connection undoubtedly gives rise to some novel issues, the Netcom
court should not have used this unique aspect of the case to avoid any finding of liability for the
sysop.
192. See notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
193. See notes 129-31, 162 and accompanying text.
194. As noted above, the court made no attempt to separate its analysis of the sysop's
liability from that of the Internet server. See 907 F. Supp. at 1381-82. See also note 188.
195. In this respect the reasons given above for infringement of the display right apply
similarly to the distribution right.
196. See White Paper at 118 (cited in note 20) ("The risk of infringement liability is a
legitimate cost of engaging in a business that causes harm to others, and that risk apparently
has not outweighed the benefits for the more than 60,000 bulletin board operators currently in
business").
197. Public Hearings (Sept. 16, 1994) at 40 (cited in note 17) (testimony of William Daniels)
(noting that if CompuServe and other sysops have their way, "we risk creating essentially
electronic, not really free ports, but more like no copyright zones. And these could exist
anywhere in the world because of the nature of electronic communications. The precedent for




scale, the trend would greatly diminish any incentive a sysop might
have had for attempting to discover and prevent copyright
infringement. 198 In fact, Netcom encourages the opposite behavior;
sysops have an incentive to avoid close monitoring of their BBSs be-
cause if they acquire knowledge of infringing behavior they may incur
contributory liability.199 Thus, an erosion of strict liability would
result in a troubling head-in-the-sand defense for sysops.
Moreover, the adoption of a contributory liability regime for
sysops would place a difficult burden on the copyright owner: proving
knowledge on the part of the sysop. The burden of proving knowledge
under a contributory liability regime did not worry the Netcom court
for two reasons. First, the uploading subscriber, Erlich, was a named
defendant in the action, and the court had already decided he would
probably incur liability.200  Even if Klemesrud avoided liability
altogether, at least one liable party would still be present.201
Second, the undisputed facts showed that Kiemesrud had
refused to remove the infringing copies from the BBS even after
having been notified of their infringing character by RTC.20 2 Because
it appears that Kiemesrud had actual knowledge, RTC would
probably succeed on its infringement claim even without strict
liability. Had the Netcom facts more closely resembled the more
common situation in which the uploading subscriber is unknown and
there is no evidence of knowledge on the part of the sysop,203 the court
may have been more reluctant to depart from strict liability.2°4
The White Paper notes other important reasons for maintain-
ing strict liability for sysops. It observes that sysops are not alone in
being at risk for "innocent" copyright infringement. Service providers
198. The White Paper correctly notes that altering the strict liability standard for sysops
"would be a significant departure from current copyright principles and law and would result in
a substantial derogation of the rights of copyright owners." White Paper at 114 (cited in note
20).
199. See note 3 for a discussion of contributory liability.
200. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1361 n.3. The court had already granted RTC a preliminary
injunction, stating that RTC had shown a likelihood of success on their copyright infringement
claims against Erlich. Id.
201. The facts showed that Erlich had made unauthorized reproductions of the copyrighted
works when he copied them into his computer and uploaded them to the BBS. See David J.
Loundy, Internet Case Shows Copyright Act Needs Revision, Chi. Daily L. Bull. 6 (Dec. 14, 1995)
(noting that the issue of Erlich's liability is fairly obvious and straightforward).
202. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1382.
203. Such as, for example, the circumstances in Playboy. See 839 F. Supp. at 1554, 1556,
1559.
204. One additional factor may have contributed to the outcome of Netcom: the relative
worthlessness of the copyrighted works in the eyes of the court. Netcom may have come out
differently had the copyrighted material been a copy of Windows '95 or some other product of
high commercial value with a strong and powerful lobby behind it.
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in all types of fields face the same potential for ignorant or innocent
infringement.205 In addition, the White Paper notes that as between
two innocent parties (the sysop and the copyright owner), the sysop,
by virtue of her control over the BBS and her business relationship
with her subscribers, is in a far better position to prevent or stop
infringements. 2 6 The White Paper also points out that sysops often
reap the rewards of storing infringing material on their BBSs.
20 7
Indeed, it seems indisputable that software and other pirating in
copyrighted materials can be big business.
20 8
In his influential article, The Proper Legal Regime for
"Cyberspace," commentator Trotter Hardy provides additional reasons
for maintaining strict liability.209 As Hardy explains, BBSs present
somewhat of a new situation for copyright law because no existing
legal analogies neatly apply to BBS environments.210 When new fact
patterns emerge, Hardy argues, the development of rules governing
such situations should be developed from the bottom up by individual
participants in response to particular facts and circumstances.211 The
205. The White Paper notes that
[mlillions of photographs are taken to photo finishers each day by individual consumers.
It is virtually impossible for these service providers to view any of those works before
they are reproduced from the undeveloped film. Yet, they operate under strict liability
standards. Likewise, book sellers, record stores, newsstands and computer software re-
tailers cannot possibly read all the books, listen to all the records, review all the news-
papers and magazines or analyze all the computer programs that pass through their es-
tablishments for possible infringements. Yet, they may be held strictly liable as dis-
tributors if the works or copies they deal in are infringing.
White Paper at 116 (cited in note 20) (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 117.
207. Id. at 117-18. The White Paper notes that sysops often charge fees for access to their
systems. Id. Put simply, systems storing and providing access to provocative and valuable
materials, especially copyrighted materials (software, pictures, music, movies, etc.), will be more
popular among subscribers and will garner a greater profit for the sysops. Furthermore, even
when the sysop does not charge a fee, she may receive the benefit of numerous free uploads of
copyrighted material from subscribers.
208. See Steve Lohr, Pirates Are Circling the Good Ship Windows 95, N.Y. Times D6 (Aug.
24, 1995) (quoting Business Software Alliance estimates that the software industry lost $15.2
billion last year to worldwide piracy); Robert Gebeloff, Software Pirates Ply the Internet,
Regulators Debate Ways to Control Problem, Record B1 (Oct. 29, 1995) (describing an incident of
software piracy and FBI and software industry attempts at dealing with the problem); Pirate
Bulletin Board Probe Settled, 3 Report on Microsoft (Feb. 13, 1995) (noting that in exchange for
allowing copyright piracy to take place on their systems, sysops receive compensation in the
form of fees and uploaded copyrighted material).
209. Hardy, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 1043-44 (cited in note 24).
210. Hardy and others note that a number of legal analogies, including book stores, librar-
ies, publishers, common carriers, broadcast media, etc., have been suggested to resolve legal
issues regarding BBSs, but that none is entirely satisfactory. Id. at 1004-08. See Schlacter, 16
Hastings Comm/Ent L. J. at 98-101 (cited in note 6); Loundy, E-Law 2.0 at *16-17 (cited in note
98).
211. Hardy, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 1026 (cited in note 24) ("After all, a problem that can be
worked out satisfactorily between two people neither requires nor benefits from the adoption of
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bottom-up approach is generally more flexible and decentralized, and
takes advantage of self-enforcement mechanisms such as contract law
and the development of appropriate customary behavior. 212
Because of the newness of BBSs and the diversity in their size
and functions, Hardy suggests that the ideal legal system would be
one that provides legal certainty and promotes a bottom-up approach
to problem solving.213 According to Hardy, the maintenance of a strict
liability standard for all sysops best effectuates this goal.214 Strict
liability forces the sysop to address the issue of copyright in-
fringement. She will perform a cost/benefit analysis to decide which
preventive measures would most effectively protect her from liability:
whether she should use indemnification contracts and, if so, what
types; what percentage (if any) of her user uploads she should screen;
whether and when she should limit uploads; whether she should
require personal information from her users; and so forth.215
In addition, strict liability provides sysops with an incentive to
seek out the other parties involved in the BBS transaction-users and
copyright owners-to resolve liability issues in advance.216 With strict
liability as the default rule, sysops will seek to contract around liabil-
ity in order to continue to operate their systems.21 7 Thus, Hardy con-
a federal statute, let alone a multi-lateral international treaty. It makes sense, therefore, to
start with the presumption that the lowest level of resolution can solve control problems,
working 'upward' in control mechanisms from there as necessary").
212. Hardy contrasts this with top-down rulemaking from a legislature or court. Top-down
rulemaking is suboptimal in new situations because it tends to be overly broad, inflexible, and
unresponsive to varying circumstances: "A uniform rule, whether judicial precedent or statute,
would appear to be suboptimal in this case: it will be exactly right for some circumstances, and
unnecessary or inappropriate for others." Id. at 1043.
213. Id. at 1043-44.
214. Id. at 1044-45. Such a standard forces each sysop to determine for herself "the most
advantageous mix of preventative measures for that BBS." Id. at 1044.
215. Id.
216. As Hardy and others have noted, however, this approach will require that courts allow
the parties to resolve the liability issues:
[Sysops] must be able to contractually shift liability when they and their users
determine that such a shift is cost effective. In the case of a BBS, the [sysop] must be
able to enforce any indemnification agreements entered into by BBS users. The benefi-
cial effects of imposing strict liability on [sysops] would be lost if courts in practice were
to find indemnity or other liability-shifting agreements to be unconscionable or unen-
forceable.
Id. at 1045. See O'Rourke, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. at *12, 16 (cited in note 24) (stating that
courts should seriously consider market issues before setting aside such liabilty-shifting
agreements).
217. Commentator Steven Metalitz has noted that even though contracts should replace
litigation in the regulation of affairs on-line, the liability regime of copyright law will always
form the basis of such contracts. Steven Metalitz, The National Information Infrastructure, 13
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 465, 471 (1995) ("Copyright continues to provide the ground rules.
Copyright defines the rights that are the subject matter of these contracts, and it defines the
default rules if a contract does not exist").
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cludes that strict liability, like that imposed by the court in Playboy,
provides the optimal means for promoting contract approaches to
liability issues in BBS circumstances.21s
B. The Frank Music Settlement: A Move Toward
Contractual Behavior
The litigation in Frank Music further illustrates the
advantages of a contract approach in addressing the copyright issues
in cyberspace. In this federal district court case, Frank Music and the
National Music Publishers Association (the "NMPA") sued
CompuServe for its role in infringing BBS transactions.219
CompuServe operated a MID1220 music BBS in which users could
upload, browse, and download actual digital copies of popular songs.2 1
CompuServe stored over nine hundred copies of digital songs on its
BBS, including the popular "Unchained Melody.' '222 Users could
browse and download the songs residing on the BBS without the
lawful authority of the copyright holders.223
Although commentators had hoped that the Frank Music liti-
gation would resolve many of the copyright issues involved in BBS
transactions, 224 the court never ruled on these issues because the
parties settled the case after two years of litigation.225 The settlement
agreement nonetheless resulted in two great benefits, according to
both sides of the dispute. First, it led to a highly innovative licensing
agreement that allows for the continued operation of the MIDI music
218. Hardy, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 1047 (cited in note 24). 'Under strict liability, '[t]here is
no need to ask the hard question of which branch of government is best able to make cost-
benefit determinations, because the matter is left in private hands."' Id. at 1044 n.126 (quoting
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Leg. Stud. 151, 188 (1973)).
219. See Settlement Reached, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) at 216 (cited in note 27).
220. The acronym "MIDI" stands for musical instrument digital interface and refers to
digitized versions of music. For a general description of MIDI technology and related legal
issues, see Christos P. Badaras, Note, MIDI Files: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated
Works, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1135, 1139-48 (1994). The MIDI music BBS was a facility for
MIDI enthusiasts to exchange and listen to one another's MIDI files.
221. Settlement Reached, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) at 216 (cited in note 27).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See What's the Score? Frank Music Settlement Leaves Law Unsettled But Confirms
Online Licensing Possibilities, 3 Voorhees Rep. (Nov. 17, 1995) (noting that the settlement does
not help "those who want to know where blame belongs when things go wrong").
225. Andrew Blum, Online Music Copyright Case Settled, Natl. L. J. B1 (Jan. 8, 1996).
Arguably, the settlement agreement muddied the waters: CompuServe agreed to pay over
$500,000 to the NMPA, while at the same time admitting no liability on the issue of copyright
infringement. Marilyn A. Gillen, CompuServe, Music Publishers Reach Deal: Online Service to
Have Music Activities Licensed, Billboard (Nov. 18, 1995).
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BBS.226 This arrangement benefits the music publishers by providing
an additional source of revenue for their copyrights.227 Second,
CompuServe, for its part, benefits from increased certainty in its
operations.228 Of greatest importance, CompuServe benefits from
certainty on the issue of liability, as the agreement establishes the
rights and responsibilities of all parties for the future.229 Because the
agreement establishes certainty in the licensing procedures,
CompuServe will be able to continue to offer the service to its
subscribers.
230
The Frank Music litigation provides a valuable demonstration
of the benefits that can be obtained by encouraging contractual behav-
ior through the use of strict liability. Strict liability destroys the
head-in-the-sand defense on one hand, and drives sysops, the pre-
dominant actors and profit makers in the BBS industry, to the bar-
gaining table on the other. Strict liability frees all parties from the
litigation costs of determining who is liable and in what capacity. In
the process, it provides incentives for sysops to seek contractual ar-
rangements with the subscribers who use their BBSs, and the artists
and publishers who provide the content for them.
Had all parties understood prior to the Frank Music litigation
that a universal standard of strict liability applied, CompuServe and
the music publishers would have saved two years' worth of legal fees.
CompuServe would have had no reason to defend the suit if it had
known that it was strictly liable. Taking this argument a step
further, had strict liability been firmly rooted at the time,
CompuServe arguably would not have allowed its infringing behavior
to take place. Before even instituting the MIDI Music BBS,
226. Who Has To Do What: Understanding the Frank Music Agreement, 3 Voorhees Rep.
(Nov. 17, 1995) (outlining the details of the settlement agreement).
227. As the NMPA's counsel Alan Shulman stated: "Publishers want to license, they don't
want to litigate." What's the Score?, 3 Vorhees Rep. (cited in note 224).
228. Id. (quoting Jeffrey Cunard, CompuServe's counsel, stating that one of the primary
benefits of the agreement is that "[it brings some certainty to the process" for CompuServe and
its subscribers).
229. See Who Has To Do What, 3 Voorhees Rep. (cited in note 226). The agreement spells
out exactly what actions CompuServe must take to avoid resuming its position as a copyright
defendant in litigation with the music publishers. Id. In order to avoid future litigation,
CompuServe will be required to (1) require the managers of the BBS to obtain licenses prior to
allowing subscribers to download protected songs, (2) require managers to agree in writing to
adhere to the settlement agreement and take steps to prevent infringement, (3) use its
reasonable best efforts to ensure compliance with the agreement, and (4) guarantee payment of
royalties to be paid by managers. Id.
230. What's the Score?, 3 Vorhees Rep. (cited in note 224) (quoting Jeffrey Cunard, noting
that the agreement benefits CompuServe by "freeling] up subscribers to do what they thought
they were always entitled to").
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CompuServe would have developed numerous precautions to prevent
the uploading and storage of infringing material. It might have ob-
tained representation and indemnification agreements from its sub-
scribers. In addition, it probably would have negotiated a licensing
arrangement with music publishers in advance. At the very least, if
the potential for strict liability had been certain, CompuServe would
not have allowed such cavalier operation of the BBS.
The settlement agreement did in fact establish an actual
knowledge standard as the trigger for any future liability on
CompuServe's part.231  Thus, the agreement itself erects what
amounts to a contributory liability standard, similar to that an-
nounced by Netcom.232 The Frank Music settlement, however, is
superior to Netcom in one critical respect. In the case of the
settlement agreement, CompuServe bargained for the liability
standard it wanted.23 It had to ensure protection, licensing, and
royalty payments for copyright owners in exchange for the reduced
liability standard. 234 Such contracting around liability is precisely the
type of behavior that the legal system should promote. As the
foregoing analysis suggests, a policy of strict liability, by providing a
powerful default rule, will most effectively encourage such behavior
on the part of sysops.
For the foregoing reasons, Netcom's adoption of a contributory
liability standard for sysops seems unpersuasive. Such an approach
departs significantly from existing law, and its widespread adoption
would cause a dramatic disruption of the rights of copyright owners.
Moreover, the Copyright Act, the House Report, and a public policy
favoring contractual resolution of liability issues all suggest that the
strict liability regime currently in place should be maintained for
sysops.
231. Blum, Natl. L. J. B1 (cited in note 225). CompuServe counsel Bruce P. Keller noted
that:
the settlement is good for the online service providers because it is a settlement that
incorporates the concept that no online providers can be liable for alleged instances of
copyright infringement by its various subscribers without some level of actual knowl-
edge of the allegations of infringement.
Id.
232. See notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
233. What's the Score?, 3 Vorhees Rep. (cited in note 224) ('CThe music publishers and
CompuServe concluded that the case was too important to be decided by the judicial process
when a commercial solution made more sense').
234. Matthew Goldstein, Accord Ends On-Line Suit Over Music: Computer Firm, Publisher





Copyright law at its core concerns a balancing of interests. In
the context of the on-line industry, a balance must be struck between
the public at large, copyright owners, and sysops. This Note argues
that our current Copyright Act and the surrounding doctrine already
strike the appropriate balance.
Notwithstanding the ability of existing law to resolve copyright
issues in the on-line context, the uncertainty surrounding judicial
application of the Copyright Act in this area has led to calls for a
recalibration of the copyright balance. On one side, the under-
protectionist group of commentators argues for a legal interpretation
that enhances the rights of sysops over the rights of copyright
owners. 235 On the other hand, the over-protectionist group calls for an
interpretation that increases the rights of copyright owners at the
expense of the public.236 Detailed analysis of the Copyright Act,
however, illustrates that neither of these approaches can be justified.
On the contrary, the Copyright Act suggests that while individual
browsing members of the public should not be held liable for copyright
infringement, sysops should be held to a standard of strict liability.
Only in this way are the rights of copyright owners and the public
best served.
In addition to the Act itself, prudence dictates that the best
approach is to maintain the current legal regime and to focus on mar-
ket solutions to the difficult problems at hand. The strict liability
regime will best serve these policy objectives. Only under a standard
of strict liability will sysops have the incentive to perfect measures
designed to prevent copyright infringement. Furthermore, strict
liability will promote a market approach to problem solving as sysops
contract around liability issues in negotiations with their users and
the copyright owners whose works they disseminate.
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235. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
236. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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